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Thinking about race: The development and
implications of racial ideology

A Dissertation

Presented in

Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

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April 2016

Department of Psychology

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Biography

Robert E. Gutierrez was born in Munster, Indiana February 4, 1985. He received a Bachelor of Science in Psychology with a concentration in Social Psychology from Loyola University Chicago in 2006. In 2010, he received his Master of Arts degree in Community Psychology from DePaul University.

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Abstract

Underlying contemporary discussions of race and race relations in the United States is the concept of racial ideology. Racial ideology comprises the ways in which individuals conceptualize racial identity, race relations, and the practical and ideal roles race plays in our lives. Two dominant models of understanding racial ideologies have emerged: Colorblindness and multiculturalism. Colorblindness advocates a race neutral approach while multiculturalism affirms and values the diversity of racialized experience. Critics of colorblindness argue that inattention to the role race plays in individuals' lives serves to propagate an unequal status quo, and can actually exacerbate racial inequality. Conversely, critics of multiculturalism argue that it emphasizes differences over similarity and contributes to racial divisions.

The current study provides an overview of racial ideology in the experience of Caucasian Americans. To this end it considered three key elements of racial ideology; 1) the factors which shape racial ideology endorsement, 2) the relationship between the colorblind and multicultural conceptualization of racial ideology, and 3) the impact of racial ideology on attributions of racism.

To this end 300 Caucasian participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk to complete an online survey. The survey included measures demographic, psychological, experiential, and community variables. Additionally, participants were measured on their endorsement of multiculturalism and colorblindness using separate measures for each. Finally, participants completed a task in which they were presented with scenarios containing conflict between actors of different races. These scenarios were divided evenly into cases of blatant and ambiguous racism. Participants were asked to rate these scenarios based on the likelihood that racism played a part in the actors' actions.

Regression analyses yielded several significant predictors of racial ideology endorsement. Political conservatism, high ethnic identification, and lack of interest in exploring other racial groups were predictive of high endorsement of colorblindness. Liberal political ideology, strong ethnic identification, and interest in exploring other ethnic groups predicted high endorsement of multiculturalism. These findings are largely consistent with the study's hypotheses and the findings of previous research. The primacy of political ideology in predicting racial ideology is particularly interesting given the high visibility of the political divide on race playing out in the current election cycle.

Endorsement of multiculturalism and colorblindness were strongly negatively correlated. In order to better understand the relationship between these two conceptualizations of racial ideology, the composite items from the colorblindness and multiculturalism measures were entered into a factor analysis. The factor analysis yielded 5 factors; Institutional Discrimination, Unawareness of Racial Privilege, Blatant Racial Issues, Egalitarian Actions, and Cultural Sensitivity. While these factors largely broke along the lines of the existing measures, the blatant racial issues factor was evenly comprised of items from both measures. These findings lend some credence to the notion that racial ideology and colorblindness exist on opposing ends of the spectrum of racial ideology. On the other hand, the emergence of four distinct factors, two from each measure, indicates the measures also consider distinctly different dimensions of racial ideology.

The effect of racial ideology on attributions of racism was tested using two regressions and controlling for psychological, experiential, demographic, and community level variables. Endorsement of colorblindness was strongly predictive of lower attributions of racism in

ambiguous cases. Multiculturalism was, on the other hand, predictive of higher attributions of racism in blatant cases of racism but unrelated to attributions of racism in ambiguous scenarios.

These findings, while consistent with previous research, conflict with the current cultural critiques of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism was associated with greater accuracy in identifying racism. There was no indication that individuals high in multiculturalism were predisposed to seeing racism in situations where there was no clear basis for such a conclusion. However, consistent with past critiques of colorblindness, endorsement of a race neutral world view was indicative of resistance to attributions of racism even in scenarios where the presence of racism was blatant.

Introduction

The state of race and race relations in the United States is a topic of constant conversation both within the sciences and in society at large. While this discussion seems ever present, there is little critical consideration of the basic underpinnings of race in popular culture. What does race mean individually and culturally? What role should and does race play in the way we interact with one another, the ways we are seen by one another and the ways in which we see ourselves? While they are often left unacknowledged, racial ideologies play a central role in both our internal understanding of race and our broader social conceptualization of racial differences and interactions.

Racial Ideologies

There is no lack of conflicting messages of what role race does or should play in the lives of Americans. This debate centers (although often unintentionally) around racial ideology, the way we conceive of racial differences, racial identity, and the role race plays in day-to-day life. As an organizing principle for the world around us, racial ideology is likely to greatly affect the ways in which we interpret social issues and the ways in which we react to social situations. Racial ideology can be conceived as the culmination of internal cognitive and emotional processes (such as in-group, out-group bias and attraction towards similarity) and external, distal cultural notions of diversity and humanity (such as eugenics, nativism, and hegemony).

The anthropologist Manning Nash described racial ideology as a way of understanding the meaning of race and racial differences informed by our cultural and political context (1962). From this perspective racial ideology exists largely as a broader cultural narrative. Nash (1962) makes the point that racial ideology develops and morphs as the landscape of interracial exposure and conflict changes. Like any form of ideology, racial ideology both reflects the

system from which it has grown and also provides explanations for and justifications of that system (Jost & Hunyady, 2003). In this way the distance between external factors and internal ones are bridged. System justification theory explains that the appeal of ideologies is their ability to justify, explain, and rationalize the status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2003; Jost & Banaji, 1994).

Racial ideologies exist in a reciprocal relationship between the individual and the broader culture. An individual's racial ideology is a reflection of broad, distal forces such as cultural narratives about race, structural inequality, and population diversity. It is also shaped by more proximal forces such as inter-racial experiences and the significance assigned to race in daily life (Plaut, 2010). Moreover this racial ideology is inherently linked to individual racial identity and the salience of such identity. While racial ideology is shaped by these factors, it also influences them. Racial ideology informs our experience and understanding of interracial contact and confirms or challenges our cultural narratives (Plaut, 2010).

Notwithstanding both the array of attitudes articulated around race and the deeply personalized nature of those attitudes, two basic ideologies have emerged as the dominant approaches to understanding race, Colorblindness and Multiculturalism.

Colorblind Ideology

Many argue that the *de facto* position of most public policy, educational approaches, and public discourse is colorblindness (Apfelbaum et al., 2012; Bonilla-Silva, 2003). The colorblind ideology stresses the inattention to race and ethnicity as being the most equitable and accurate way to understand race. The maxim "I see people, not color" is meant to affirm the equality of all races, while deterring focus on differences between the races (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2003). The explicit claim is that race should not matter, but the implicit claim is that race no longer matters. The latter statement operates under the assumption that we are living in a world that is

"post-race", where race no longer matters despite a great deal of data to the contrary (Bonilla-Silva, 2003).

Colorblind ideology grew out of language surrounding segregation laws (Plaut, 2010). Colorblindness represented the idea of legal, and ultimately social, irrelevance of racial identity (Plaut, 2010). The argument in support of colorblind ideology seems simple: to alleviate racial discrimination, we must eliminate the perception of racial differences. While this seems simplistic, Richeson and Nussbaum (2003) point out that there is grounding for this approach in several areas of social psychology which find group salience to have negative effects. For example, research on ingroup/outgroup bias has demonstrated not only a preference for ingroup members, but also a tendency to separate and homogenize outgroup members (Brewer, 1999). Based on these findings, it is reasonable to think that reduction of group salience and perceived dissimilarity would be viable approaches to reduction in racial discrimination.

One explanation of the dichotomous perspectives on colorblind ideology come from Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, and Chow (2009) who conceptualized two approaches to conceptualizing colorblindness, procedural and distributive. Distributive justice is an egalitarian approach whose main concern is reducing discrepancies in outcomes. This approach embraces the idea that outcomes should be comparable across racial groups. This is a conceptualization that is arguably close to the Civil Rights Era conceptualization of colorblindness; since race is not a factor, members of different racial groups will not have systematically different outcomes. In this conceptualization of colorblindness, the ideology serves to promote an egalitarian ideal. Conversely procedural justice focuses not on equality of outcomes but on the equality of institutional rules and practices. This conceptualization of justice creates a colorblindness that, the authors contend, can serve to legitimize inequality. By focusing on fairness of rules and their

application existing inequality in a system is essentially reinforced. Individuals embracing this form of colorblindness would reject policies that treat racial groups differently despite the fact that doing so might reduce differences in outcomes experienced by these groups (Knowles et al., 2009).

In his seminal work *Racism without Racists*, Carlos Bonilla-Silva (2003) argues that instead of eliminating racism, colorblind ideology has generated a way for individuals to continue discrimination while focusing on “nonracial” issues. Bonilla-Silva argues that the colorblind approach ignores institutionalized racism and generations of economic inequality and instead explains contemporary racial inequality in terms that are more socially acceptable in a nation that views itself as nonracist.

Concurrently, a growing body of empirical psychological research has come to question the effectiveness and the assumptions of the colorblind ideology (Morrison, Plautt, and Ybarra, 2010; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2003). Empirical studies have begun to associate the colorblind ideology with less sensitivity to racial discrimination and less empathy for racial minorities when compared to multicultural ideology. These studies will be discussed in greater detail in the Impacts of Ideology subsection.

Multiculturalism

Broadly considered, multiculturalism argues that culture is deeply important both at a societal and individual level. Given the importance of culture and the diversity of cultural backgrounds in our modern society, the best way forward is to recognize and celebrate diversity (Takaki, 1993). The idea that inattention to issues of race and diversity creates a problematic interpretation of relations is central to multiculturalism which stresses cultural diversity and the maintenance of cultural identities within society (Wolsko, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink, 2000).

Critics of multiculturalism see this view as divisive as it is seen to oppose common culture and to emphasize differences between racial groups instead of commonalities. Proponents argue that it is instead a recognition and respect of real differences and a belief that acknowledging and accepting diversity is part of a successful society (Plaut, 2010). When society embraces the diversity inherent in all aspects of the human experience (race, gender, religion, etc.), then diversity and, by extension, difference, become something that is common to all (Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi, and Sanchez-Burks, 2011).

Multiculturalism as a term represents a constellation of concepts. These concepts include psychological, philosophical, political, and in some cases legal bases (Plaut et al., 2011). Given the breadth of this term and its myriad applications, it is necessary to make clear the use of the term in the proposed study. In the emergent body of psychological research around multiculturalism, two related but separate conceptualizations have emerged. The first, and arguably dominant, model is that of the European context. Multiculturalism as conceptualized in Europe (with most of the research available in the English language emerging from Northern European and Scandinavian countries) focuses on immigration and integration of non-Europeans into Europe. In this context multiculturalism refers to the contact between the dominant national cultures and immigrant cultures (for example, the integration of Turkish immigrants into the Netherlands (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2005, Verkuyten, 2005). In this context multiculturalism stands in contrast to nationalist or monocultural points of view.

In the European model the monocultural view takes the form of assimilation, the idea that immigrants should adopt the dominant culture of the host country and move away from customs, language, and values of their culture of origin. In this model a stark dichotomy is drawn between a native and foreign culture (Verkuyten 2005).

While researchers in the United States are very much interested in the contact between dominant and immigrant cultures, the majority of that research is done under the banner of acculturation, enculturation, and attitudes around both (Berry, 1997). When the term multiculturalism is utilized in the US context, it most often refers to the relationships and connection between racial groups in the United States. A good example of this would be Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, and Casas (2007) in which multiculturalism is envisioned as the endorsement of racial diversity and the significance of cultural context. It is within this US context that the proposed study operates and with this “endorsement of racial and ethnic diversity” understanding of the term multiculturalism. There are many parallels between these two models but for the current study we will be focusing on the US model, and the research generated within it.

Development of Inter-racial Ideology

An emerging body of research suggests that multiculturalism is most likely to be seen as beneficial to groups who fall outside the majority culture. Research suggests this belief is related both to adoption of multiculturalism by racial minorities and resistance to the idea by Caucasian Americans. Ryan and colleagues (2007) found that African American respondents were more likely to endorse the use multiculturalism as a way to improve intergroup relations (as opposed to colorblind ideology) than Caucasian respondents were.

Many researchers have argued that the implications of colorblind ideology appeal to Caucasians as they serve to legitimize a racial status quo that favors Caucasians (Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Knowles et al., 2009; Wolsko et al., 2000). This perspective focuses on which racial ideology best suits the broader world view of the group. If the racial status quo includes inequality, it is beneficial to those benefiting from such inequality to view their racial identity as

unimportant as doing so means that other factors must account for any success enjoyed. Knowles and colleagues (2009) for example found that White respondents were more likely to embrace colorblind ideological tenants when they perceived intergroup threat. Moreover, when White participants perceived challenges to the racial status quo, they were more likely to embrace the construal of colorblindness as a procedural justice concern. This approach highlights the need for fairness not in outcomes but in institutional rules and their application, an approach which often serves to reinforce the racial status quo.

Conversely, cultural critics of multiculturalism argue that any focus on one's race when considering status is a form of victim mentality in which one instead ignores individual and experiential factors in favor of racial identity (Levrau and Loobuyck, 2013). Locke (2014), for example, argued that critiques of colorblindness served to build up the importance of race and racial differences instead of downplaying them. This emphasis on race, he believed, served to exacerbate racial divisions and inhibit progress on racial discrimination. This view is highly visible in much of the popular cultural narrative around racism. Many cultural commentators have pointed to hypersensitivity and victim mentalities as motivators for minority and minority allied individuals to seek out racial discrimination where it does not occur. While this narrative has gained much traction in the common culture, there is not much empirical support for the position that racial awareness, or the awareness of racial discrimination, lead to a victim mentality. Carter (2008), for example, found in her study of African American students, building race consciousness and exploring racism in the United States did not lead to internalizing racial discrimination but instead strengthened their resolve and commitment to being positive models for their race.

The Role of Demographics

The primary demographic variable considered in previous research has been race. The racial differences in endorsement of ideology have been explored in depth by several studies (Neville et al., 2000; Ryan et al., 2009; Ryan et al., 2007). These studies have primarily supported the notion that Caucasians are more likely than African Americans (Neville et al., 2000; Ryan et al., 2007) and Latinos (Neville et al., 2000; Ryan et al., 2010) to endorse colorblindness over multiculturalism. Since the current study focuses specifically on Caucasian participants, the demographic variables considered focus on variables other than race.

Past findings on the relationship between age and racial ideology have not produced much in the way of significant results, largely due to the majority of studies utilizing university subject pools and therefore having little diversity in terms of age in their sample. Munroe and Pearson (2006) in their analysis of multicultural endorsement, for example, found that older participants were more likely to endorse multiculturalism than younger participants. However, they had an age range which only extended to 35 and had few participants over 30 years of age in their study.

Consideration of the effect of education on racial ideology has primarily focused on the role of higher education. Research into the effect of higher education has found that endorsement of colorblindness tended to decrease over the course of a university education (Neville, Poteat, Lewis, and Spainerman, 2014). This effect was most powerful for students who were exposed to courses which explored diversity. That latter finding is in keeping with Munroe and Pearson's finding that students who had taken 4 or more college courses dealing with elements of diversity were much more likely to score high on multiculturalism than students who had taken fewer than 4 such courses. It is certainly not a given that more education guarantees more exposure to

courses dealing with diversity (one would assume that an Associate's degree in Sociology may contain more such courses than a Ph.D. in Chemical Engineering). However, education beyond high school is likely to bring with it an increase in opportunities (and likely requirements) for such courses.

Political ideology refers to an individual's self-described political orientation ranging from conservative to liberal. In this understanding, political ideology is a label or demographic variable, rather than a psychological process. There has been a fair amount of research dealing with the relationship between psychological processes underlying racial ideology and racism. Studies on implicit associations have for example found that high right wing authoritarianism is strongly predictive of implicit bias against African Americans (Rowatt & Franklin, 2004). Right wing authoritarianism has been identified as a key underlying cognitive tendency within political conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway, 2003).

Knowles and colleagues (2009) argued that colorblind ideology helped Caucasian participants defend the racial status quo. This is relevant to the understanding of the relationship between political orientation and racial ideology for two key reasons. Firstly, two of the psychological constructs underlying conservative political ideology is a resistance to change and a tendency to justify inequality (Jost et al., 2003). It would then follow that self-identified conservatives would be more likely to endorse colorblindness due to their tendency to favor the status quo. Similarly Neville and colleagues found a strong positive correlation between endorsement of colorblind racial ideology and belief in a just world (2000). This is notable as belief in a just world is one of the underlying psychological elements of conservatism identified by Jost and colleagues (2003).

Research has also indicated that conservative ideology is predictive of attitudes regarding the presence of racism. Navarro, Worthington, Hart & Khairallah (2009) for example found that when controlling for student racial identity, college students who self-identified as conservative were more likely to view the racial climate of a university campus as positive. They were much less likely than liberal or moderate students to indicate that their college campus has problems with racial discrimination.

The Role of Experience and Ecology

The variables associated with analyses of racial ideology formation have traditionally operated at the individual level. Some studies have begun to bridge individual level variables to examine interpersonal experience. The primary interpersonal variable studied has been intergroup exposure (Ryan et al., 2007; Saguy, Dovidio, and Pratto, 2008). In the European model of multiculturalism, intergroup exposure is commonly seen as a way to grow multiculturalism by humanizing and “de-mystifying” the other (Vekuyten and Martinovic, 2006). However, Ryan and colleagues (2007) found in their study of racial ideology in the United States that greater intergroup contact in participants (both African American and Caucasian) led to greater endorsement of colorblind ideology. Despite this finding both Ryan (2007) and Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) found that intergroup exposure was associated with less prejudice in participants regardless of participant race.

One possible explanation of the Ryan et al. (2007) finding is that the positive correlation between intergroup exposure and colorblindness is the result of group members seeing their commonality. Saguy and colleagues (2008) observed that increased intergroup contact focusing on similarities, rather than differences, lead to an increase in feelings of intergroup harmony and

equality. However, actions of those in dominant groups in this study did not reflect the perceptions of equality.

Despite this acknowledgment of the importance of individual experiences such as intergroup contact, the use of experiential variables has not expanded beyond interpersonal interaction. Previous research has not investigated the impact of community level variables such as community racial composition, socioeconomic characteristics or other broader community variables.

Intergroup exposure can be conceptualized in many ways. Many measures attempt to capture for the quantity and quality of intergroup contact across multiple life domains such as social life, schooling, and the workplace (Ramirez, 1998). Intergroup exposure when conceptualized in that matter contains both intergroup contact by choice, for example joining a racially diverse social organization, and intergroup contact that may be guided by outside forces such as attending a diverse local public school. An individual's community is an example of a hybrid of choice and outside forces. While it is certainly true that people have some choice in the community they call home, forces such as income, housing prices, work, and familial ties also drive such choices. Despite the fact that community plays such a large part in a person's day to day experiences and development, there is no research currently on the effect of community racial composition on the development of racial ideology. Community racial composition is a factor that has morphed a great deal in the past decades. In their analysis of American communities from 1980 to 2010, Lee, Iceland, and Sharp (2012) found that almost universally communities across the United States had become more diverse.

Their analysis found that racial diversity had increased during that time in 97.8% of all metro areas and 95.6% of rural counties. Similarly they found that from 1980 to 2010 the percent

of communities which were 90% or more Caucasian had dropped from 65.8% of US communities to 36% (Lee et al., 2012). Changes in community racial composition highlight the increased intergroup exposure that comes with more diverse communities. While more diverse communities do not inherently mean that individuals will intentionally interact with members of other racial groups. Such exposure does mean that the presence and influence of other racial groups becomes more and more visible.

The Role of Psychological Constructs

Another explanation for the formation of racial ideology is racial salience and identification. Racial salience refers to the degree to which one is aware of and invested in their racial identity (Todd, Spanierman, and Aber (2010). A strongly related concept is that of racial identification, the extent to which racial identity factors into one's overall identity (Phinney, 1992). Numerous studies have demonstrated racial identity plays a much stronger role in overall identity for members of ethnic and racial minorities than for majority group members (Phinney, 1992; Todd et al., 2010).

This is indicative of a larger trend in which diversity is treated as referring to only the marginalized or “minority” populations. This omission is a typically an inadvertent way in which these dominant identities become “normed” in such discussions (Sampson, 1993). When a “dominant” group such as Caucasians are left out of discussions of diversity, in this case racial diversity, the term diversity then comes to mean anything that is different than Caucasian. This process mischaracterizes diversity and reinforces perceptions of Caucasian as being the normal or natural race (Ward, 2008). This is highly problematic as it both serves to treat racial minorities as other and simultaneously ignores the culture and impact of White racial identity (Watts, 1992).

An emerging body of research has attempted to better understand what role ethnic identification in Caucasian individuals might play in endorsement of racial ideology and in racial discrimination. Studies attempting to identify the relationship of racial identification to racial ideology have mostly been confined to those focusing on immigration, comparing multiculturalism to assimilation and therefore are not ideal analogues to the current study (Verkuyten and Brug, 2004; Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2006). Those studies found that strong racial group identification was related to stronger hostility towards multiculturalism. It might seem counterintuitive that strong Caucasian identification would be related to the endorsement of colorblind ideology, which posits that race is a meaningless category. However, such an endorsement is consistent with the idea that colorblind ideology is more about defending privilege than it is focused on actual reduction in prejudice (Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Knowles et al., 2009).

It has been suggested that this fundamental difference in the place race is seen as holding in an individual is strengthened by explicit messages about race. Caughy, O'Campo, Randolph, and Nickerson (2002) argue that the use of a multicultural, race affirmative, approach to educating children about race is utilized in African-American homes as a result of the need to address race's role in identity and explain issues that may arise during intergroup exposure. This is consistent with findings that racial minorities are more likely report a belief that racial discrimination is prevalent (Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, and Hodson, 2002; Plaut, 2010). Conversely, Schofield (2001) argues that Caucasian children are typically taught from the colorblind perspective. Apfelbaum, Sommers, and Norton (2008) argue that the use of such an approach stems at least partly from a desire not to appear racist by removing race from the discussion entirely.

Plaut, Garnett, Buffadri, and Sanchez-Burks (2011) found in a multiple study design that one of the strongest predictors of hostility towards multiculturalism in Caucasians was a feeling that multiculturalism excluded them. While consistent with past findings that racial minority group members were more likely to endorse multiculturalism than were racial majority members (Neville, Lily, Lee, Duran, and Browne; Ryan et al. 2007; Wolsko et al., 2006), Plaut and colleagues posited an empirically derived cognitive factor played a role in this difference in endorsement. Their studies indicated that Caucasian respondents were more likely than members of other racial groups to feel that “diversity” did not include them and that diversity initiatives excluded them (Plaut et al., 2011). This feeling of exclusion, in turn, predicted lack of support for diversity initiatives.

This finding seems to be an excellent example of the normative identity in which identities that are most privileged, e.g. Caucasian racial identity, male heterosexual identity, ableness, are treated as the norm and all other identities as different and diverse (Sampson, 1993; Watts, 1992). The process of normative identity yields the idea that in discussions of identity the normative identity is considered neutral and therefore is not critically examined. This uncritical view of normative identity produces the so-called absent standard. The absent standard is characterized by the situation in which normative identities such as Whiteness are understudied and poorly understood despite acting as the primary point of comparison for “diverse” marginalized identities (Todd et al., 2010; Watts, 1992).

This empirical association could, at least partially, explain why high racial identification in Caucasians would be related to endorsement of colorblind ideology. If Caucasian respondents strongly identify with their race and feel that multiculturalism as an approach values nonwhite diversity over their racial identity, then it would make sense for them to embrace the colorblind

ideology. In this way they may even further perpetuate the normative position of Whiteness. By rejecting the notion of multiple normative identities, most of which are seen as antithetical to white normative identity, Caucasians may reinforce the idea that their racial experience is indeed the norm.

State versus Trait

Arguably the biggest distinction in the way that studies treat racial ideology is state versus trait. Like similar debates in personality research, racial ideology can be seen as a somewhat permanent trait characteristic of a person or as a state which may be primed or manipulated by researchers. Studies which measure racial ideology as a participant variable to be measured (examples include Neville et al., 2000, Ryan et al., 2007, and Wolsko et al., 2000) imply that racial ideology is a trait characteristic of a person.

At the same time several studies have manipulated racial ideology as an experimental variable. Demonstrating an ability to manipulate the racial ideology of a participant would seem to support the alternative position that racial ideology is a state which may be influenced by or dependent on external circumstances. Richeson and Nussbaum's work (2004) would seem to be a particularly strong example of this state view of racial ideology. In their study participants were exposed to a short written argument supporting either the colorblind perspective or the multicultural perspective. It can be assumed that college-aged participants held attitudes regarding race prior to the study's priming of ideology. Despite that fact, Richeson and Nausbaum found that a relatively short ideological prompt, was enough to produce significant group differences in the bias demonstrated by their participants (2004).

In keeping with the idea of situational impact on ideology, as well as the notion that ideology is utilized to justify the status quo, Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, and Chow (2009) found

that endorsement of an ideology can shift and mutate depending on the degree to which it suits an individual's current needs. In this model ideology does not just exist to legitimize cultural context, it is constantly warping in its meaning and application in order to suit a myriad of often contradictory situations and settings within that context.

Impacts of Ideology

Prior to the growth of research exploring the impact of racial ideology was work in social psychology looking at prejudice reduction strategies. Much of the work in this area during the 1980s and 1990s was focused on reducing, or at least acknowledging, racial categorization (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2003). Much of this work focused on the empirical findings around categorization. As early as Gordon Allport's 1954 *The Nature of Prejudice*, social psychology targeted in-group formation as a major precursor of discrimination. The idea that perceived group dissimilarity and categorization were at the heart of discrimination would seem to support the colorblind approach to intergroup relations. If discrimination is the result of perceived group differences, then it would make sense to focus on reducing perceived group dissimilarity to remedy discrimination. Richeson and Nussbaum (2003) note a shift in the late 1990s towards questioning these assumptions. They point to the work done by Greenwald and colleagues (2002) that finds that categorization and the corresponding activation of attitudes often happen automatically and without conscious consideration. In a psychology that includes these "implicit" associations, it is then increasingly difficult to argue that people should ignore race as a solution to racial discrimination.

Racial Ideology and Racial Attitudes

Out of this shift away from traditional assumptions regarding group dissimilarity's role in discrimination emerged a body of research comparing the outcomes of colorblind and multicultural approaches. Richeson and Nussbaum, for example, found that participants who were presented a message espousing the colorblind ideology showed greater racial attitudes bias than those who were presented a message advocating the multicultural approach. This difference in racial bias was true both for explicit measures of racial discrimination and implicit, or automatic, measures of racial bias.

Neville and colleagues (2000) also found a positive relationship between racial discrimination and endorsement of colorblind ideology. Participant high in endorsement of colorblind ideology were more likely to score high on the Modern Racism Scale, an instrument which measures explicit negative attitudes towards African Americans. On their face these results would seem counter intuitive as colorblindness would seem contrary to making broad generalizations, negative or positive, of a racial group. This finding would seem to support the theoretical proposition that endorsement of colorblind ideology serves to legitimize inequality (Bonilla-Silva, 2003). Additionally, they found that for their racially diverse participants, endorsement of colorblind ideology positively predicted a belief in a just world. Belief in a just world similar to colorblind ideology is often posited as serving to rationalize privilege and minimize marginalization (Neville, Awad, Brooks, Flores, and Bluemel, 2013).

A common criticism of multiculturalism is that it emphasizes group membership over individual characteristics. The salience of group membership in a multicultural perspective is seen as divisive and reinforcing a racial attributions of behavior. Wolsko and colleagues (2000) found that exposing Caucasian individuals to the multicultural approach did indeed lead to

participants to consider racial information in their appraisals of out-group member more than did exposure to the colorblind approach. However, as opposed to being harmful to intergroup relationships, Wolsko and colleagues argued that integration of category (racial group) information led to more accurate judgments of individuals and did not reduce intergroup positivity. Colorblind ideology, they argued, led to ignoring useful information and less accurate judgments.

Racial Ideology and Intergroup Conflict

In addition to its effects on racial discrimination, researchers have begun to explore how racial ideology impacts our perception of intergroup conflict. Apfelbaum, Paulker, Sommers, and Ambady (2010) found that when children were taught from a colorblind perspective they were far less likely to correctly identify blatant examples of racism than were students who were taught from the multicultural (or race affirmative) perspective. These results would seem to support Wolsko and colleagues findings (2000) that colorblind ideology hurt the accuracy of judgments about racism.

A counter explanation for this finding could be that individuals exposed to the multicultural perspective might pay too much attention to race and therefore see racism in situations in which racism was not present. Such an explanation would be in keeping with cultural critics of multiculturalism (Bonilla-Silva, 2003). However, Apfelbaum and colleagues (2010) controlled for this possibility by also including a set of examples in which racial differences were present but it was ambiguous whether racism was a factor in the outcome. On these examples children exposed to the multicultural perspective were no more likely to report racism being present than those who had been exposed to the colorblind perspective.

Rationale

The current study builds on growing body of literature on the importance and impact of inter-racial ideology. While there has been much development on the topic in the past 10 years, there is still much to be investigated both in the determinants of inter-racial ideology formation and in the effects inter-racial ideology has on cognition and behavior. A fundamental challenge in much of the work done to date is that research is focused solely on multicultural or colorblind attitudes. Studies which treat inter-racial ideology as a trait typically examine the determinants or impact of endorsement of one racial ideology, most often colorblind ideology (Neville et al., 2000; Ryan et al., 2007). While these studies typically acknowledge that colorblind and multicultural ideologies are not poles on the same scale, they often implicitly treat them that way by measuring only one.

The current study contributes to the understanding of inter-racial ideology in two key ways. Firstly, the study will directly address the inconsistencies in the conceptualization of inter-racial ideologies by utilizing separate and distinct measures for both the endorsement of colorblind ideology and for endorsement of multicultural ideology. This allows for an examination of the relationship between the two ideologies. As described above, past studies that operationalized inter-racial ideology as a continuous variable typically either focused on one of the two patterns (e.g., Colorblind ideology in Apfelbaum et al., 2008) or measure only one pattern while implicitly treating the other as the opposite end of a bipolar scale (e.g., Morrison et al., 2010). The current study's use of two independent scales not only allows for separate analysis of each ideology but also allows for the two scales to be compared and the relationship between the two variables clarified. In short, while some studies of colorblind ideology have commented on multiculturalism, implicitly treating it as the polar opposite of colorblind ideology

(and vice versa), this is the first study to include separate scales designed to capture and explicitly compare endorsement of colorblind and multicultural ideology.

Secondly, this study expands the understanding of the determinants and impact of inter-racial ideology. By exploring the impact of demographic characteristics (political ideology, income, and education), experience (intergroup exposure), psychology (ethnic identification) and ecology (community racial composition) on participants' endorsement of racial ideologies, this study greatly increases the scope of variables considered.

While previous studies (Ryan et al., 2007; Wolsko et al., 2006; Worthington et al., 2008) have investigated the role various factors play in the development of inter-racial ideology, the focus has been predominately on individual variables such as ethnic identification and political attitudes. This study expands on previous studies' experiential and psychological variables but also addresses the contribution of ecological variables such as the racial makeup of individuals' home communities.

Additionally, the use of regression models allows the current study to examine the relative contribution of these diverse experiential, demographic, psychological and community variables. This broadened scope does not just expand the variables whose impact on inter-racial ideology formation have been examined but allows for a more nuanced understanding of the interrelationship between these variables.

Research Questions

Research Question I. What is the relationship between endorsement of colorblind racial ideology and endorsement of multiculturalism?

RQ I A. How do scores on measures of colorblindness and multiculturalism correlate?

RQ I B. Do colorblindness and multiculturalism share underlying factors?

Statement of Hypotheses

Hypothesis I. Demographic and community level variables are predictors of racial ideology.

Hyp I A. Political conservatism, younger age, higher income, and racially homogenous community racial makeup predict higher levels of colorblindness.

Hyp I B. Political liberalism, increased age, and diverse community racial makeup predict higher levels of endorsement of multiculturalism

Hypothesis II. Psychological and experiential variables predict racial ideology endorsement.

Hyp II A. High ethnic identification, low interest in exploring other cultures (other Group Orientation) and low intergroup exposure predict higher levels of colorblindness

Hyp II B. Low ethnic identification, high interest in exploring other cultures (other group orientation) and high intergroup exposure predict higher levels of multiculturalism.

Hypothesis III. In ambiguous cases of racism, racial ideology differences do not predict labeling cases of ambiguous racial discrimination as racist.

Hyp III A. Endorsement of colorblind ideology does not predict participants incorrectly labeling cases of ambiguous of racial discrimination as racist.

Hyp III B. Endorsement of multicultural ideology does not predict participants incorrectly labeling cases of ambiguous of racial discrimination as racist.

Hypothesis IV. Racial ideology predicts racist attributions in cases of blatant discrimination.

Hyp IV A. Endorsement of colorblind ideology predicts participants being less likely to correctly identify cases of blatant racial discrimination.

Hyp IV B. Endorsement of multicultural ideology predicts greater accuracy in identifying blatant racism.

Method

Participants

The current study recruited 300 participants using the Amazon Mechanical Turk online service. Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a subsidiary of Amazon.com is a micro task site which allows users to complete short tasks for compensation. Several studies comparing data collected using MTurk and more traditional data collection methods have indicated that they produce comparable data (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). The advantages of using MTurk are that it allows for large national (or international) sample to be collected in a relatively short period of time. Buhrmester and colleagues (2011) found that samples collected via MTurk were far more demographically diverse than samples generated from undergraduate subject pools.

The sample was limited based on several demographic variables established in the screening questionnaire (see Materials section and Appendix A). Due to the pronounced racial differences in the factors predictive of racial ideology discussed in the chapter 1, the sample was limited to Caucasian respondents. Additionally, because ideas of race and ethnicity are intrinsically linked to national culture, respondents were limited to those living in the United States. Additionally, participation was limited to individuals 18 years of age or older who identify as English language fluent. While accounting for differences based on ethnicity and national origin is useful and important (see Ryan et al., 2006), such accounting falls outside of the scope of this study. The documented diversity of MTurk users (Buhrmester et al., 2011) allows for demographic comparisons on variables such as political affiliation, education, and geographic location within the U.S.


Of the 300 participants 55% were male ($n= 165$) and 45% were female ($n= 135$). The youngest respondent was 19 years old, while the oldest was 69 with an average age of 35.64 years ($SD= 11.54$). Participants varied widely in their education level, marital status, and household income. While participants fell across the spectrum for each of these three demographic variables, the majority of participants had at least some college education (87%), had never been married (53.67%), and had a household income of less than \$50,000 (66.33%). Data for these variables are listed in table 1 below.

Table 1. Respondent education level, marital status, and household income.

Education	<i>N</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Less than high school	1	0.33%
High school graduate (or GED)	38	12.67%
Some college (no degree)	84	28.00%
Associate degree	36	12.00%
Bachelor degree	109	36.33%
Masters or professional degree	30	10.00%
Doctoral degree	2	0.67%
Marital Status		
Single (never married)	161	53.67%
Married	103	34.33%
Separated/Divorced	29	9.67%
Widowed	6	2.00%
Missing	1	0.33%
Household Income		
Less than \$25,000	81	27.00%
\$25,000 to \$34,999	57	19.00%
\$35,000 to \$49,999	61	20.33%
\$50,000 to \$74,999	64	21.33%
\$75,000 to \$99,999	24	8.00%
\$100,000 to \$149,999	12	4.00%
\$150,000 to \$199,999	1	0.33%
\$200,000 or more	1	0.33%

Participants included individuals from 44 states. The states represented, and the number of participants from those states, are displayed in Figure 1 below. The states with the highest number of participants were California with 43 and New York with 27. The states with no participants included were Montana, Wyoming, Georgia, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Maine.

Figure 1. Map of Participants by State.



Political affiliation and political ideology were measured separately. For political affiliation the largest percentage of participants identified as Democrat ($n = 125$, 41.67%), followed by respondents identifying as Independent ($n = 80$, 26.67%), and Republican ($n = 56$, 18.67%). Additionally 16 participants identified as Nonpolitical (5.33%), 8 as Socialist (2.67%), 7 as Libertarian (2.33%), and 4 as affiliating with the Green Party (1.33%). Political ideology focused on participants political leanings ranging from very conservative to very liberal. While political affiliation is useful way to understanding the study's sample political orientation,

described below, will be used in the inferential analyses. The rationale behind this is twofold. Firstly, the categorical nature of political affiliation does not lend itself to the regressions utilized in the current study. Secondly, political affiliation is subject to many confounding variables as there are social, cultural, and historical influences of party affiliation which go beyond simple endorsement of or objection to a party platform. Respondents' political ideology is laid out in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Respondent Self-reported Political Ideology.

Political Ideology	<i>N</i>	Percent of Sample
Very Conservative	10	3.37%
Conservative	31	10.44%
Somewhat Conservative	32	10.77%
Moderate	71	23.91%
Somewhat Liberal	51	17.17%
Liberal	61	20.54%
Very Liberal	41	13.80%

Respondents also provided their current zip code. This allowed for the racial composition of the respondents zip code to be identified through the US Census data. For the current study racial composition was defined as the percent of the population identifying as Caucasian, being of only one race, and not identifying as Hispanic. Based on zip code data 30% of participants lived in neighborhoods with 90% or more Caucasian residents only 12.33% lived in zip codes that were less than 50% Caucasian. This is more or less in keeping with past findings that on average Caucasian Americans live in neighborhoods that are majority (77%) Caucasian (Lee et al., 2012). Full racial composition data is detailed in Table 3.

Table 3. Neighborhood Racial Composition by Zip Code.

Community Racial Makeup	<i>N</i>	Percentage
9.99% or less Caucasian	5	1.67%
10% to 19.99% Caucasian	5	1.67%
20% to 29.99% Caucasian	7	2.33%
30% to 39.99% Caucasian	11	3.67%
40% to 49.99% Caucasian	9	3.00%
50% to 59.99% Caucasian	14	4.67%
60% to 69.99% Caucasian	31	10.33%
70% to 79.99% Caucasian	52	17.33%
80% to 89.99% Caucasian	73	24.33%
90% or more Caucasian	89	29.67%
Missing	4	1.33%

Materials

The current study includes several measures. Predictive variables were measured by a personal background questionnaire (demographic and community variables), a measure of interracial exposure, and a measure of ethnic identification. Endorsement of racial ideologies was measured with the ColorBlind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS) and the Munroe Multicultural Attitudes Scale (MASQUE). The dependent variables are measured using the Racist Attributions Task. Individual measures are described below.

Demographic information (Appendix C) was collected using a brief questionnaire. Participants were asked to indicate their age, political ideology (on a scale ranging from very conservative to very liberal), education level (on a scale ranging from less than 9th grade to graduate degree), socio-economic level (as indicated by household income) and zip code. Political ideology is being treated as a demographic variable as the current study focuses solely on self-identified political orientation and not the underlying psychological variables

documented in past research studies such as right wing authoritarianism, dogmatism, and openness to new experience (Jost et, al, 2003).

Participants were not asked to indicate race in this portion of the survey as they had already indicated identifying as Caucasian in the eligibility questionnaire. Community racial composition was based on the participant's zip code. Community racial composition was scored from 0-100% based on the percentage of persons residing in that zip code identifying as White, single race, non-Hispanic based on the 2010 census. Data from this portion is detailed in the participants section above.

Intergroup Exposure was measured using a version of the Multiracial Exposure Index (MEI) first composed by Ramirez (1998). The 19 items of the MEI (Appendix D) asks participants to rank the racial diversity of a variety of contexts and experiences in the lives such as “the neighborhood I grew up in was comprised of people who were...” and “I most often spend time with people who are...” For each item participants were asked to indicate on a scale ranging from 1= almost all the same race as me to 7= almost all a different race from me. In order to extend the range of the measure and not create a black-white dichotomy, the survey was adapted from the version used by Ryan and colleagues (2007) which asks only about exposure to African Americans.

Scores on the scale range from 17 to 85 with higher scores indicating more exposure to members of racial groups other than their own. Participants had an average score of 34.82 with a standard deviation of 11.86. The measure showed strong reliability ($\alpha=.93$). This is comparable to findings by Ryan and colleagues (2007) who found strong reliability both for Caucasian participants ($\alpha=.89$) and for African American participants ($\alpha=.88$).

Strength of Ethnic Identification was measured using Phinney's (1992) Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM). The MEIM (Appendix G) measures the degree to which participants identify with their ethnic heritage. The measure is designed (as its name indicates) to, and has been validated for, work across ethnic groups. Participants indicated their ethnic background and responded on a 5 point Likert-type scale (1= Strongly Disagree to 5= Strongly Agree) to items regarding their involvement in and affirmation of their ethnic background. The measure is designed to be flexible and allow participants to self-identify their ethnicity. While all participants had self-identified as Caucasian during the screening process, this measure allowed them to choose the term that most closely mirrored their ethnic identity. These potential responses included pan-ethnic terms like White and Caucasian as well as nationality based identities such as Irish American, Italian American, and Polish.

Factor analysis of Phinney's (1992) model yielded 3 factors contributing to ethnic identification; Affirmation and Belonging, Ethnic Identity Achievement, and Ethnic Behaviors. These factors were confirmed in a later examination by Ryan and colleagues (2007). Affirmation and Belonging refers to the extent to which a person feels a part of and related to their own ethnic group, an example of an item in this subscale is, "I have a strong sense of belonging to my own ethnic group". Ethnic Identity Achievement refers to the extent to which a participant has developed a mature, secure sense of their own ethnic identity. An example of an Ethnic Identity Achievement item would be, "I understand pretty well what my ethnic group membership means to me, in terms of how to relate to my own group and other groups". The third subscale, Ethnic Behaviors, focuses on the extent to which participants are active in groups and cultural practices related to their ethnicity. An example item of the Ethnic Behaviors subscale is, "I participate in cultural practices of my own group, such as special food, music, or customs".

Additionally a fourth separate subscale of the MEIM, Other Group Orientation, was included. The MEIM Other Group Orientation (OGO) scale was conceived as a part of an individual's larger social identity separate from their ethnic identification (Phinney, 1992). The OGO captures the respondents' attitudes and interactions with other ethnic groups than their own. In this way OGO is not a subscale of the MEIM (its items are not part of the Overall MEIM scale) but instead a complimentary scale. An example question from the subscale is, "I enjoy being around people from ethnic groups other than my own".

The Overall MEIM scale consists of 14 items with total scores ranging from 14 to 70; higher scores indicate stronger identification with one's own ethnic group. Responses on the Overall MEIM showed strong reliability with a Cronbach's alpha of .89 comparable to the established range $\alpha=.81$ to .9 found in Phinney's original research (1992). The Overall MEIM scale includes the items found in the Affirmation and Belonging subscale, the Ethnic Identity Achievement subscale, and the Ethnic Behaviors subscale. In the present study high reliabilities were also found for the Affirmation and Belonging subscale ($\alpha=.89$), Ethnic Identity Achievement ($\alpha=.81$), and the Other Group Orientation scale ($\alpha=.81$). The Ethnic Behaviors subscale, which is by far the shortest subscale at only 2 questions, had poor reliability ($\alpha=.41$) and therefore was not included in any analyses. Reliability, means, and standard deviations are detailed for the scale and subscales in Table 4 on the following page.

Table 4. Scale statistics for Multi-group Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM).

Scale	<i>N</i>	<i>A</i>	\bar{x}	<i>SD</i>
Overall MEIM	290	.89	46.61	9.37
MEIM- Affirmation and Belonging	297	.89	16.67	4.15
MEIM- Ethnic Identity Achievement	292	.81	22.84	5.15
MEIM- Ethnic Behaviors	295	.42	6.16	1.70
MEIM- Other Group Orientation	292	.81	23.10	4.25

Endorsement of ColorBlind Racial Attitudes was measured using the *ColorBlind Racial Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS)* (Neville et al., 2000). The CoBRAS scale (Appendix E) measures the extent to which participant's attitudes towards race and race relations in the United States correspond to the colorblind ideology. The scale consists of 20 statements about race each followed by a 5-point, Likert-type scale in which participants' indicate the degree to which they agree ranging from (1) not at all to (5) strongly. One example of a constituent item is "Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations." A reverse scored item would be "Racial and ethnic minorities do not have the same opportunities as white people in the U.S."

Scores on the CoBRAS scale range from 20 to 100 with higher scores indicating strong endorsement of colorblind ideology. Respondents in the current study had an average score of 56.29 with a standard deviation of 14.72. The scale was very highly reliable with a Cronbach's alpha of .93 compared to $\alpha=.86$ in the original validation study by Neville and colleagues (2006).

Endorsement of Multiculturalism was measured using the Munroe Multicultural Attitude Scale Questionnaire (MASQUE). MASQUE measures endorsement of multiculturalism based on the three components of Banks' transformative approach: to know, to act, and to care (Munroe and Pearson, 2006). The measure includes 18 items answered on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). An example of a standard item would be "I care about respecting diverse cultural values", an example of a reverse coded item would be "I do not understand why people of other cultures act differently". The MASQUE measure was conceptualized around 3 types of questions, those which referred to knowing, those which referred to acting, and those referring to caring. Example of similar items across each of these three categories are "I believe that racism exists", "I do not act to stop racism (reverse coded)",

and “I am sensitive to differing expressions of ethnicity”. Each of these three items refers to a different manner of relating to race.

Potential scores on the MASQUE range from 18 to 90 with higher scores indicating stronger support for multicultural ideology. Participants averaged a score of 66.07 with a standard deviation of 8.93. The internal consistency of the 18 item MASQUE indicated very good reliability ($\alpha = .86$) comparable to the initial validation test reliability ($\alpha = .80$) in Munroe and Pearson (2006).

Racist Attributions were measured by using a series of vignettes adapted from Noles (2007) into the Racist Attribution Task (RAT). The original measure consisted of 8 short vignettes in which an individual is mistreated in some way. The adapted and expanded measure includes 10 vignettes (Appendix H). The incarnation of the RAT used in the current study maintained the structure of the original measure, but utilized a novel set of scenarios developed specifically for this experiment. Each vignette involves two or more characters, of different races, interacting with one another. The 10 scenarios created for the current study covered a variety of situations and involved actors of various, but always different, races. In each of the vignettes, there is some level of conflict between participants. In 5 of the vignettes, it is intentionally ambiguous whether racism played any factor in the motivation of the characters (Racist Attribution-Ambiguous, RAT-A) and in 5 it is blatantly clear that racism played a factor (Racist Attribution-Blatant, RAT-B). Below is a sample of an ambiguous vignette;

Credit card-While standing in line at a department store, a Black female customer noticed that the clerk did not ask the White woman in front of her for identification after making an expensive purchase on a credit card. When she approached the clerk to pay for her purchases, she was immediately asked for

identification when she pulled out her credit card.

For comparison the next sample is of a blatant vignette.

Jane, an African American woman, had just moved in to her new dorm room.

After getting situated she joined a group of students in the lounge area. One of the students was talking about how she wished her best friend, whom she had hoped to room with, would have been accepted to the university. After a while she turned to Jane and told her how lucky she was that she was able to get accepted because of Affirmative Action.

The scenarios were not piloted with participants but were instead checked for face validity by the research team prior to use in the current study. Ambiguous scenarios were designed to have no clear evidence that race was involved in decision making or motivation of the vignette actors. For blatant scenarios all vignettes specifically indicated that the actor had based their decision making or action on the race of the other participant(s).

For each vignette participants used a 5-point, Likert-type scale to indicate the likelihood that racism played a factor from not at all (1) to very likely (5). Scores for each subscale (Racist Attribution Task Ambiguous and Racist Attribution Task Blatant) range from 5 to 25 with higher scores indicating participants believed that racism played a strong role in the actions contained in the constituent vignettes. Metrics for the new measure are presented in Table 5 below.

Table 5. Scale Metrics for Racist Attributions Task

Subscale	<i>N</i>	<i>α</i>	\bar{x}	<i>SD</i>
RAT_Ambiguous	295	.61	14.51	3.15
RAT_Blatant	294	.83	22.16	3.42

The data summarized in table 5 support the establishment of the new metric. Participants were significantly more likely to identify racism as present in the blatant scenarios than in the ambiguous scenarios. The comparatively low inter item reliability of the RAT ambiguous subscale reflects the uncertainty of the motivation of actors in ambiguous scenarios. **Instrument**

All measures were combined into a single instrument. That instrument was formatted as an online survey using the program Qualtrics and linked to the MTurk service. The Racist Attribution Task (RAT) was presented first as it is the measure most likely to suffer from carryover effects. The demographics questionnaire was presented last as it is the least likely to be affected by carryover from other measures.

Procedure

Participants were recruited from the MTurk users. MTurk users are individuals who have registered with the MTurk system in order to complete short tasks for reimbursement. Participants were able to access the online survey through the MTurk site. Before participants began the study, they completed the eligibility questionnaire. Eligibility was assessed via a 5-question screening survey administered before the experiment. MTurk users wishing to take part in the study were asked one question with multiple response options: What racial group(s) they identify as, and 4 yes/no questions: Whether or not their first language is English, whether they are living in the United States, whether they are over 18 years of age, and whether or not they can spend one uninterrupted hour working on the survey.

During the screening questionnaire participants were not made aware of the selection criteria for the study. This was done to ensure that participants were not able to alter responses in order to be included as they were blind to responses which would render them ineligible for participation. Those participants who did not self-identify as Caucasian/White/European

American or who answered no to any of the four yes/no questions were taken to a message thanking them for their interest and explaining why they did not qualify for the current study.

Participants who met the eligibility requirements were redirected to the Qualtrics website to complete the survey. Informed consents were issued to participants meeting all inclusion criteria as explained above. Participants were informed of their rights as participants, including the voluntary nature of their participation, their ability to stop participation without penalty, and the study's ability to assure confidentiality of responses. Participants were also given a general overview of the task, its duration, intent, and instructions going forward.

Participants were offered \$1.00 to complete the survey, which they were able redeem using a code generated at the end of the survey. This process allowed them to receive payment through Amazon without providing their identifying information to the researchers. Paolacci and colleagues (2010) have established that the amount of reimbursement for a task on MTurk does not seem to affect the quality of the data collected, only the speed in which the study sample reaches its intended size.

The entire survey was completed online at the time and place of the subjects' choosing, however, the survey was completed in a single sitting and participants had a maximum window of one hour to do so. Participants took on average 18 minutes to complete the survey. At the completion of the survey participants were presented with both an embedded debriefing explanation as well as a downloadable (PDF) copy of the debriefing form. Participants were required to verify that they had read the debriefing information before continuing on the page providing them with their completion code. The debriefing form can be found in Appendix I.

Results

All data was scaled and computed using either the existing procedures from previous research or, for new measures, totaled in the manner described in the Measures section above. Analyses revolved around three primary questions: (1) What predicts endorsement of racial ideology? (2) What is the relationship between endorsements of colorblind and multicultural ideologies? (3) What predicts attributions of racism? The sections below summarize the findings in each of these three areas.

Predicting Endorsement of Racial Ideology

Hypotheses I and II focused on what factors predicted endorsement of racial ideology. Two multiple regressions looked at the factors that predict endorsement of colorblind ideology (CoBRAS) and multicultural ideology (MASQUE). Based on previous research the current study proposed two groups of factors as predictors of racial ideology. The first block of factors were demographic and community variables including age, education, political ideology, income, and the percent of their home zip code who identified as White, non-Hispanic. Hypothesis I contended that within this demographic and community variable block, political conservatism, younger age, higher income, and racially homogenous community racial makeup predict higher levels of colorblindness and that political liberalism, increased age, and diverse community racial makeup predict higher levels of endorsement of multiculturalism and The second block of proposed factors included psychological and experiential factors including, ethnic identification (MEIM), interracial exposure (MEI), and other group orientation. Hypotheses II predicted that high ethnic identification, low interest in exploring other cultures (other group orientation) and low intergroup contact would predict higher levels of colorblindness, and that low ethnic

identification, high interest in exploring other cultures (other group orientation) and high intergroup exposure predict higher levels of multiculturalism.

Correlations were run for all potential independent and dependent variables to determine the appropriateness of including said variables in the regression analyses. Based on these correlations several factors were dropped from the regression analysis. The final predictor blocks only included variables that were significantly correlated with at least one of the dependent variables, CoBRAS and MASQUE. The variable correlations are summarized in Table 6 on the following page.

Table 6. Correlations for Demographic, Psychological, Experiential, Community, and Racial Ideology Variables

	Age	Education	Political Ideology	Income	Racial Composition	Ethnic Identification	Interracial Exposure	Other Group Orientation	Colorblind Ideology	Multicultural Ideology
Age	1	-.03	-.13*	-.010	.12*	.07	-.23***	-.04	.02	-.05
Education	-.03	1	.08	.22***	-.07	.14*	.05	.06	-.06	.02
Political Ideology	-.13*	.08	1	-.04	.05	-.23***	.03	.27***	-.55***	.41***
Income	-.01	.22***	-.04	1	.00	.23***	-.02	.12*	.03	.13*
Racial Composition	.12*	-.07	.05	.00	1	-.11	-.33***	-.04	-.05	-.01
Ethnic Identification	.07	.14*	-.23***	.23***	-.11	1	-.06	.04	.25***	.08
Interracial Exposure	-.23***	.05	.03	-.02	-.33***	-.06	1	.34***	-.05	.07
Other Group Orientation	-.04	.06	.27***	.12*	-.04	.04	.34**	1	-.31***	.64***
Colorblindness	.02	-.06	-.55***	.03	-.05	.25***	-.05	-.31***	1	-.55***
Multiculturalism	-.05	.02	.41***	.13*	-.01	.08	.07	.64***	-.55***	1

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. **, Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. ***, Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level .

Sample sizes for the correlational analyses ranged from n=292 to n=301.

The first set of analyses tested the predictive power of the significantly correlated demographic and psychological variables on endorsement of racial ideology. The first block of factors in this revised model was composed of the demographic variables, political ideology and Income. The second block of factors included the psychological variables ethnic identification (MEIM), and other group orientation.

The first analysis, summarized in Table 7 below, examined this two block model's ability to predict endorsement of colorblind ideology (CoBRAS). The demographic variable block significantly predicted endorsement of colorblind ideology score with $F(2,290) = 64.60, p < .001$, and the R squared indicated that model 1 explained 30.8% of variance in endorsement of colorblindness. The sole significant predictor in this model was political ideology, $t(292) = -11.36, p < .001$.

Model 2, incorporated the psychological variables, ethnic identification and other group orientation along with the demographic variables from block 1. This model significantly predicted endorsement of colorblindness, $F(2,290) = 39.60, p < .001$, with the R squared indicating that Model 2 explained 35.5% of the variance in endorsement of colorblindness. This was a significant improvement over Model 1, $F_{\text{change}}(2, 288) = 10.41, p < .001$. The significant predictors in this model were political ideology, ethnic identification, and other group orientation. Political ideology was negatively predictive of endorsement of colorblind ideology, $t(292) = -9.33, p < .001$, so that the more liberal a participant self-identified the less likely they were to endorse colorblind ideology. Ethnic identification was positively related to endorsement of colorblind ideology, $t(292) = 3.13, p = .002$, as the strength of ethnic identification increased, so did endorsement of colorblindness. Finally other group orientation was negatively predictive

of endorsement of colorblindness, $t(2,290) = -3.59, p < .001$), so that as other group orientation increased colorblindness decreased.

Table 7. Predictors of Endorsement of Colorblind Ideology.

		B	SE B	<i>B</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>R</i> ²	ΔR^2
Model 1						64.60***	.31	
	Constant	78.49	2.51		14.67***			
	Political Ideology	-4.90	.43	-.56	-9.33***			
	Household Income	.02	.47	.01	.04			
Model 2						39.60***	.36	.05***
	Constant	78.24	5.33		14.67***			
	Political Ideology	-4.17	.45	-.47	-9.33***			
	Household Income	.02	.47	.002	.04			
	Ethnic Identification	.24	.08	.16	3.13**			
	Other Group Orientation	-.61	.17	-.18	-3.59***			

* Significant at the 0.05 level. **.Significant at the 0.01 level. *** Significant at the .001 level.

In order to explore the proportion of variance predicted by each of the predictor variables after the contributions of the other variables has been accounted for, follow up regressions were run using political ideology, ethnic identification, and other group orientation each entered as the last factors in the regression to predict colorblindness. By entering each variable last in a series of regressions the unique additional variance in endorsement of colorblindness each variable accounted for was ascertained.

Political ideology explained the greatest amount of unique variance of any of the variable included in the model. When entered last political ideology explained an additional 19.5% of variance in endorsement of colorblindness, $F_{\text{change}}(1, 288) = 87.13, p < .001$. Other group orientation explained an additional 2.9% of variance in endorsement of colorblindness when entered last, $F_{\text{change}}(1, 288) = 12.90, p < .001$. Ethnic Identification accounted for an additional 2.2% in variance explained when entered last, $F_{\text{change}}(1, 288) = 9.79, p = .002$. The addition of

Income to the model explained an insignificant amount of variance in endorsement of colorblind ideology, $F_{\text{change}}(1, 288) = .001, p > .05$.

These findings partially supported hypotheses IA and IIA. Consistent with hypothesis IA, political conservatism was positively predictive of endorsement of colorblind ideology. In keeping with Hypothesis, IA income was positively correlated with endorsement of colorblind ideology. However income was insignificant as predictor of endorsement of colorblind ideology in both models of the regression. Contrary to hypothesis IA, age and racial makeup of the community were not related to endorsement of racial ideology. Hypothesis IIA was largely supported with higher ethnic identification predicting higher endorsement of colorblind racial ideology and interest in exploring other cultures being negatively predictive. Contrary to Hypothesis IIA, intergroup exposure was not correlated with endorsement of colorblind ideology.

The second analysis used the same two block model to predict endorsement of multicultural ideology (MASQUE). The demographic variable block significantly predicted endorsement of multiculturalism, $F(2,290) = 33.14, p < .001$. The R squared indicated that model 1 explained 18.6% of the variance in multiculturalism scores. Both of the factors in the model were significant, positive predictors of endorsement of multiculturalism. As political ideology increased, in this case meaning the more participants self-identified as liberal,, the higher the endorsement of multiculturalism, $t(292) = 7.75, p < .001$. Similarly as household income increased, so did endorsement of multiculturalism, $t(292) = 2.66, p < .01$. A follow up regression was run to examine the relative contributions of each of the demographic variables in block 1. Political ideology alone accounted 16.9% of variance in endorsement of multiculturalism. The

addition of income to the model explained an additional 2% of the variance in endorsement of multiculturalism.

Model 2, which incorporated the psychological variables, ethnic identification and other group orientation also significantly predicted endorsement of multiculturalism, $F(4,288)= 64.70$, $p< .001$. The R squared for the Model 2 indicated that the Model explained 47.3% of the variance in endorsement of multiculturalism. This was a significant improvement over Model 1, $F_{\text{change}}(2, 288) = 78.55$, $p< .001$. The significant predictors in this model were political ideology, ethnic identification, and other group orientation. Political ideology was positively predictive of endorsement of multicultural ideology, $t(289)= -6.37$, $p< .001$), so that the more liberal a participant self-identified, the higher their endorsement of multiculturalism. Ethnic identification was positively related to endorsement of multicultural ideology, $t(289)= 2.54$, $p= .012$), with endorsement of multiculturalism increasing as the strength of ethnic identification did. Finally other group orientation was positively predictive of endorsement of multiculturalism, $t(289)= 12.00$, $p< .001$), so that as other group orientation increased multiculturalism increased. The regression analyses are summarized below in Table 8.

Table 8. Predictors of Endorsement of Multicultural Ideology.

		B	SE B	β	T	F	R^2	ΔR^2
Model 1						33.14***	.19	
	Constant	53.54	1.66		32.27***			
	Political Ideology	2.21	..29	.41	7.75***			
	Household Income	.83	.31	.14	2.66**			
Model 2						64.70***	.47	.29***
	Constant	26.89	2.94		9.14***			
	Political Ideology	1.57	.25	.29	6.37***			
	Household Income	.29	.26	.05	1.10			
	Ethnic Identification	.11	.04	.12	2.54*			
	Other Group Orientation	1.13	.09	.54	12.00***			

** Significant at the 0.05 level. *.Significant at the 0.01 level. *** Significant at the .001 level.

The proportion of variance predicted by each of the predictor variables after the contributions of the other variables have been accounted for was explored. Follow up regressions were run using political ideology, ethnic identification, and other group orientation; each was entered the last factor in separate regression analyses to predict endorsement of multiculturalism. By entering each variable last in a series of regressions, the unique additional variance each variable accounted for in the endorsement of colorblindness could be ascertained.

Other group orientation explained the greatest amount of unique variance of any of the variable included in the model. When entered last other group orientation explained an additional 26.3% of variance in endorsement of multiculturalism, $F_{\text{change}}(1, 288) = 143.85, p < .001$. Political ideology explained an additional 7.4% of variance in endorsement of multiculturalism when entered last, $F_{\text{change}}(1, 288) = 40.60, p < .001$. Ethnic identification accounted for an additional 1.2% in variance explained when entered last, $F_{\text{change}}(1, 288) = 6.43, p = .01$. The addition of income to the model explained an insignificant amount of variance in endorsement of multicultural ideology, $F_{\text{change}}(1, 288) = 1.22, p > .05$.

The findings that increased ethnic identification was predictive of higher endorsement of both colorblindness and multiculturalism challenged the logic of the study's finding that the two racial ideologies were strongly negatively correlated. In order to ascertain the underlying source of this seemingly paradoxical finding follow up regressions were run using two ethnic identification subscales, belonging and affirmation and ethnic identity achievement. A model including both ethnic identity subscales was strongly predictive of both endorsement of colorblindness, $F(3,291) = 25.98, p < .001$, and endorsement of multiculturalism, $F(3,291) = 14.53, p < .001$.

The R^2 generated by the model indicated that the ethnic identity subscales were predictive of 21.1% of variance in endorsement of colorblindness and 13% of the variance in endorsement of multiculturalism. The directionality of the relationships between the two individual subscales and the racial ideology metrics shed some light on the previous findings. Affirmation and belonging was positively predictive of endorsement of colorblindness, $t(291) = 8.57, p < .001$, and negatively predictive of endorsement of multiculturalism, $t(291) = -4.86, p < .001$. Thus as belonging and affirmation increased endorsement of colorblindness increased and endorsement of multiculturalism decreased. Conversely identity achievement was positively predictive of endorsement of multiculturalism, $t(291) = 6.20, p < .001$, and negatively predictive of endorsement of colorblindness, $t(291) = -3.18, p = .02$. Thus as identity achievement increased endorsement of multiculturalism increased and endorsement of colorblindness decreased.

These findings partially supported Hypotheses IB and IIB. Consistent with hypothesis IB, political liberalism was positively predictive of endorsement of multiculturalism. Contrary to hypothesis 1B, age and community racial makeup were not related to endorsement of multiculturalism, and higher income was significantly predictive of higher endorsement of multiculturalism. Consistent with hypothesis IIB, interest in other ethnic groups was positively predictive of endorsement of multiculturalism. While hypothesis IIB anticipated a negative relationship between ethnic identification and endorsement of multiculturalism, the reverse was actually found.

The Relationship between Colorblind and Multicultural Ideology

Research Question I inquired, “What is the relationship between endorsement of colorblind racial ideology and endorsement of multiculturalism?” Multiple steps were taken to understand the relationship between colorblind and multicultural ideology. Firstly, a simple

correlation was run between the endorsement of colorblind ideology (CoBRAS) and endorsement of multicultural ideology (MASQUE). This analysis yielded a strong negative correlation between the variables ($r(297) = -.55, p < .001$) in which higher endorsement of multiculturalism was predictive of lower endorsement of colorblindness.

This correlation helped inform the factor analysis that was then run on the 37 constituent items of the CoBRAS (20 items) and MASQUE (17 items) scales. The items from each scale were entered into a factor analysis using a varimax rotation to determine if the questions from those scales loaded on similar factors. Because the CoBRAS and MASQUE scales were highly correlated ($r = -.554, p < 0.001$), this information was considered as part of the decision as to what type of factor analysis was run. Based on the high correlation between CoBRAS and MASQUE, a varimax rotation was used. The varimax is an orthogonal rotation method that produces independent factors which eliminates issues of multicollinearity. The varimax was chosen in order to produce independent factors despite the high correlation between items. Despite this correlation the current study assumes that distinct, yet inter-correlated variables, underlie racial ideologies. By utilizing an orthogonal rotation the current study maximizes the likelihood of identifying these underlying traits whose presence would be overlooked by an oblique rotation. Rotation converged in 9 iterations. For the analysis the eigenvalue was set to 1.25 and items were considered as loading if they had a value over .4. For those loading on multiple factors, an item was determined to be loading on a single factor if there was a difference of at least .13 between the factor loadings for the item (Comery & Lee, 2013).

The factor analysis is based on an N of 275 due to eliminating cases in which less than 85% of items from a scale (CoBRAS, MASQUE, or both) were answered. The N of 275 is slightly less than common standard sample size for factor analysis of 300; however, this number

is also much larger than the minimum threshold of 5 cases per included item set by Comery and Lee (Comery & Lee, 2013). One way to accommodate for smaller sample sizes is to raise the threshold for accepting a factor loading as significant. Hair, Tatham, Anderson and Black devised a table for acceptable factor loading based on samples size (1998). The minimum sample size in their proposal for a .4 loading cutoff (as used in this study) was 200 participants, far less than the current study's sample size. Factors in Table 9 are those for which the question loaded clearly on. For questions in which there was not a clear loading, all potential data points are included.

The analysis yielded five factors, each with an eigenvalue greater than 1.25 and at least 4 items clearly loading on that factor. All 37 items loaded on at least one factor (above the .4 threshold). Four items loaded on two or more factors and were not assigned to a single factor due to the difference in loading not exceeding the .13 threshold. Table 10 below summarizes the factors yielded by the analysis.

Table 9. Factor Analysis of CoBRAS and MASQUE Scales (CoBRAS items in Red and MASQUE Items in Blue).

Variable	(1) Institutional Discrimination	(2) Unawareness of Racial Privilege	(3) Blatant Racial Issues	(4) Egalitarian Action	(5) Cultural Sensitivity
Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly against white people.	.72				
Racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.	.70				
White people in the U.S. are discriminated against because of the color of their skin.	.69				
Immigrants should try to fit into the culture and values of the U.S.	.65				
English should be the only official language in the U.S.	.62				

Variable	(1) Institutional Discrimination	(2) Unawareness of Racial Privilege	(3) Blatant Racial Issues	(4) Egalitarian Action	(5) Cultural Sensitivity
It is important that people begin to think of themselves as American and not African American, Mexican American, or Italian American.	.60				
Talking about racial issues causes unnecessary tension.	.55				
Due to racial discrimination, programs such as affirmative action are necessary to help create equality.*	.53				
Race plays a major role in the type of social services (such as type of health care or day care) people receive.*		.76			
Race is very important in determining who is successful and who is not.*		.75			
Race plays an important role in who gets sent to prison.*		.75			
Racial and ethnic minorities do not have the same opportunities as white people in the U.S.*		.71			
White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.*		.69			
Everyone who works hard, no matter what race they are, has an equal chance to become rich.		.59			
I believe that racism exists.			.74		
I know that social barriers exist.			.66		
Racism may have been a problem in the past, it is not an important problem today.			-.65		
I understand that gender-based inequities exist.			.65		
I understand sexual preferences may differ.			.64		
I understand religious beliefs differ.			.63		
Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.			-.57		
It is important for political leaders to talk about racism to help work through or solve society's problems.			.52		
It is important for public schools to teach about the history and contributions of racial minorities.			.50		

Variable	(1) Institutional Discrimination	(2) Unawareness of Racial Privilege	(3) Blatant Racial Issues	(4) Egalitarian Action	(5) Cultural Sensitivity
I do not actively intervene when I see religious prejudice.*				.75	
I do not take action when witnessing bias based on people's preferred sexual orientation.*				.73	
I actively challenge gender inequities.				.72	
I do not act to stop racism.*				.72	
I respectfully help others to offset language barriers that prevent communication.				.55	
I am emotionally concerned about racial inequality.				.55	
I am sensitive toward people of every financial status.					.65
I am sensitive to differing expressions of ethnicity.					.59
I am respect religious differences.					.54
I am not sensitive to language uses other than English.*					.44
I accept the fact that languages other than English are spoken.					.49
I do not understand why people of other cultures act differently.*					.47
White people are more to blame for racial discrimination than racial and ethnic minorities.	.47	.54			
Racism is a major problem in the U.S.		.45	-.50		

*= Reverse coded item.

The factor analysis indicated that 5 factors were underlying racial ideology as measured by the CoBRAS and MASQUE surveys. Three of the factors found in the analysis conform to the factors of the CoBRAS scale found in the initial validation of the CoBRAS measure in Neville and colleagues (2000). Neville and colleagues described these factors as Institutional Discrimination, Unawareness of Racial Privilege, and Blatant Racial Issues. While these 3 factors were consistent with previous findings, there was a shift in which of the three factors

explained the most variance. Similarly, Munroe and Pearson (2009) had laid out 3 factors for their MASQUE scale, To Know, To Act, and To Care. The current factor analysis also seemed to support their original conceptualization.

The 5 identified factors collectively accounted for 54.85% of variance. Table 10 below summarizes the characteristics of these 5 factors.

Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for the 5 Racial Ideology Factors.

Factor	No. of Items	Eigen Value	% of Variance	<i>M (SD)</i>	Cronbach's α
1 Institutional Discrimination	8	11.16	30.16	24.57(6.52)	.84
2 Unawareness of Racial Privilege	7	3.45	9.32	17.74(5.69)	.88
3 Blatant Racial Issues	9	2.44	6.60	39.28(5.22)	.87
4 Egalitarian Action	6	1.79	4.83	17.13(3.84)	.79
5 Cultural Sensitivity	6	1.46	3.95	15.13(2.59)	.65

Factor 1, labeled institutional discrimination in keeping with the Neville and colleagues (2000) classification, included 8 items. These 8 items centered on attitudes towards and awareness of institutional forms of discrimination. This included questions on issues like affirmative action and language use. This factor had an eigenvalue of 11.16 and explained 30.16% percent of the variance. This is a divergence from the initial CoBRAS validation in which institutional discrimination was the second most powerful factor, and explained far less of the variance. Notably, no items from the MASQUE scale loaded on the institutional discrimination factor.

Factor 2 was also a carryover from Neville and colleagues (2000) and the label, unawareness of racial privilege was maintained. Unawareness of racial privilege included 7

items and accounted for 9.32 percent of variance with an eigenvalue of 3.45. This factor centered on the extent to which participants seemed aware of the role racial privilege may play in the lives of both Caucasians and racial minorities. In past analysis this had been the factor to account for the most total variance (Neville et al., 2000), but in the current study it was the second most. Again no MASQUE scale item loaded on this factor originally articulated in the CoBRAS survey validation.

Factor 3, the final carryover from Neville and colleagues (2000), was titled blatant racial issues. Blatant racial issues was conceived by Neville and colleagues as a basic awareness that racial discrimination persisted as an issue in U.S. life. Blatant racial issues contained 9 items. Most notably this is the only of the 5 factors to contain items from the MASQUE scale and CoBRAS scale. Blatant racial issues contained 4 items from the CoBRAS scale and 5 items from the MASQUE scale. The items from the MASQUE scale which loaded onto the blatant racial issues factor came from the factor conceptualized as “to know” by Munroe and Pearson (2009). Blatant racial issues had an eigenvalue of 2.41 and accounted for 6.60% of total variance.

Factor 4 was consistent with the “to act” factor articulated by Munroe and Pearson (2009). In order to maintain consistency in naming conventions across factors, Factor 4 is referred to as egalitarian action in the current study. Egalitarian action was comprised of 6 items and had an eigenvalue of 1.79. Items on egalitarian action focused on individuals’ willingness to intervene or otherwise take action to reduce discrimination. Egalitarian action accounted for 4.83 percent of variance.

Factor 5 was consistent with the “to care” factor articulated by Munroe and Pearson (2009). In order to maintain consistency in naming conventions across factors, Factor 5 is referred to as cultural sensitivity in the current study. Cultural sensitivity was comprised of 6

items and had an eigenvalue of 1.46. Items on cultural sensitivity focused on individuals' self-reported respect for cultural differences. Cultural sensitivity accounted for 3.95 percent of variance. This factor had a low internal consistency with a Cronbach's $\alpha=.65$. The low internal consistency is most likely due to the diverse nature of the questions, referring to language diversity, economic diversity, ethnic diversity, and religious diversity.

As noted above the orthogonal rotation technique utilized in the current study maximizes the likelihood of identifying independent factors. This has been used in order to identify potential underlying factors. It is important than to assess the interconnectedness of the factors generated by this rotation process. Table 11 lays out the correlations between the 5 factors generated by the factor analysis. The five factors were all significantly correlated with one another, with correlations ranging from weak to strong.

Table 11. Predicting Racist Attributions Correlation Matrix

	Institutional Discrimination	Unawareness of Racial Privilege	Blatant Racial Issues	Egalitarian Action	Cultural Sensitivity
Institutional Discrimination	1	.570**	-.529**	-.442**	-.280**
Unawareness of Racial Privilege	.570**	1	-.578**	-.318**	-.227**
Blatant Racial Issues	-.529**	-.578**	1	.467**	.324**
Egalitarian Action	-.442**	-.318**	.467**	1	.504**
Cultural Sensitivity	-.280**	-.227**	.324**	.504**	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Predicting Racist Attributions

Two multiple regressions looked at the impact of colorblind ideology (CoBRAS), multiculturalism (MASQUE), ethnic identity (MEIN), exposure to individuals of other races (MEI), and demographic characteristics on attributions of racism in blatant and ambiguous cases of racial discrimination. Correlations were run for all potential independent and dependent

variables to determine the appropriateness of including said variables in the regression analyses.

All of the potential independent variables were significantly correlated with at least one of the dependent variables with the exception of income, which was therefore dropped from the subsequent regressions. The correlation matrix regression variables are summarized in Table 11 on the following page.

Table 12. Predicting Racist Attributions Correlation Matrix

			Political		Racial	Ethnic	Other Group	Interracial	Color-	Multi-	Ambiguous	Blatant
	Age	Education	Ideology	Income	Composition	Identification	Orientation	Exposure	blindness	culturalism	Racism	Racism
											Attributions	Attributions
Age	1	-.027	-.128*	-.010	.115*	.067	-.037	-.234**	.016	-.046	.080	.200**
Education	-.027	1	.082	.215**	-.066	.144*	.059	.045	-.057	.018	.146*	-.100
Political Ideology	-.128*	.082	1	-.037	.045	-.229**	.265**	.033	-.554**	.407**	.283**	.205**
Income	-.010	.215**	-.037	1	.001	.230**	.118*	-.021	.029	.131*	-.003	.009
Racial Composition	.115*	-.066	.045	.001	1	-.108	-.041	-.328**	-.046	-.009	.035	.128*
Ethnic Identification	.067	.144*	-.229**	.230**	-.108	1	.043	-.055	.254**	.081	-.144*	-.090
Other Group Orientation	-.037	.059	.265**	.118*	-.041	.043	1	.341**	-.311**	.641**	.137*	.291**
Interracial Exposure	-.234**	.045	.033	-.021	-.328**	-.055	.341**	1	-.047	.070	.027	-.245**
Colorblindness	.016	-.057	-.554**	.029	-.046	.254**	-.311**	-.047	1	-.554**	-.520**	-.350**
Multiculturalism	-.046	.018	.407**	.131*	-.009	.081	.641**	.070	-.554**	1	.268**	.472**
Ambiguous Racist Attributions	.080	.146*	.283**	-.003	.035	-.144*	.137*	.027	-.520**	.268**	1	.279**
Blatant Racist Attributions	.200**	-.100	.205**	.009	.128*	-.090	.291**	-.245**	-.350**	.472**	.279**	1

* Significant at the 0.05 level. **.Significant at the 0.01 level. *** Significant at the .001 level.

For both regressions statistical assumptions were tested for violations. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) were examined for multicollinearity and the residual plots were examined for heteroscedasticity. All VIF scores were under 4, indicating that there were no issues with multicollinearity. Residual plots indicated no problem with heteroscedasticity.

The first of the two regressions focused on incidents of ambiguous racism. Hypothesis III predicted that in ambiguous cases of racism, racial ideology differences do not predict labeling cases of ambiguous racial discrimination as racist. The dependent variable was racist attributions for ambiguous scenarios. The independent variables were entered in three sequential blocks. The first block included demographic variables: Age, education, political ideology, and racial composition of neighborhood. The second block added the psychological and experiential variables: Ethnic identification, other group orientation, and interracial exposure. The third block added the two racial ideologies: Colorblindness and multiculturalism. The full results of the regression are detailed in Table 12 on the following page.

Table 13. Predictors of Racist Attributions in Ambiguous Scenarios.

		B	SE B	<i>B</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>R</i> ²	ΔR^2
Model 1	Constant	9.41	1.09		8.62***	9.17***	.12	
	Age	0.04	0.02	0.14	2.52*			
	Education	0.34	0.13	0.14	2.45*			
	Political Ideology	0.53	0.11	0.29	5.01***			
	Racial Composition	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.18			
Model 2	Constant	10.47	1.79		5.86***	5.92***	.13	.01
	Age	0.04	0.02	0.15	2.57*			
	Education	0.38	0.14	0.16	2.76**			
	Political Ideology	0.46	0.11	0.25	4.02***			
	Racial Composition	0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.27			
	Interracial Exposure	0.00	0.02	0.00	-0.05			
	Other Group Orientation	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.91			
	Ethnic Identification	-0.04	0.02	-0.12	-1.99*			
Model 3	Constant	19.33	2.40		8.04***	13.83***	.31	.18***
	Age	0.03	0.01	0.12	2.31*			
	Education	0.33	0.12	0.14	2.72**			
	Political Ideology	-0.02	0.12	-0.01	-0.15			
	Racial Composition	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.17			
	Interracial Exposure	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.40			
	Other Group Orientation	-0.04	0.05	-0.06	-0.78			
	Ethnic Identification	-0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.57			
	Colorblindness	-0.11	0.02	-0.53	-7.53***			
	Multiculturalism	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.18			

* Significant at the 0.05 level. **.Significant at the 0.01 level. *** Significant at the .001 level.

Model 1, based on the four demographic variables, significantly predicted attributions of racism in ambiguous scenarios, $F(4,281)=9.17, p<.001$. The R^2 value indicated that the demographic variables explained 11.5% of the variance in racist attributions in ambiguous scenarios. Three of the four demographic variables in model 1 were significant predictors of racist attributions in ambiguous scenarios. Age was predictive of racist attributions in ambiguous scenarios, so that as age increased so did the likelihood an individual would label an ambiguous situation as being based in racism, $t(285)=2.52, p=.012$. Education was also predictive of racist

attributions in ambiguous scenarios, so that as education increased so did the likelihood an individual would label an ambiguous situation as being based in racism, $t(285) = 2.50, p = .013$. Finally, political ideology was predictive of racist attributions in ambiguous scenarios, so that the more liberal an individual was the more likely they were to label an ambiguous situation as being based in racism, $t(285) = 5.01, p < .001$.

These findings largely supported hypothesis III. Consistent with hypothesis IIIB endorsement of multiculturalism was unrelated to attributions of racism in ambiguous scenarios. While hypothesis IIIA predicted no relationship between endorsement of colorblindness in ambiguous scenarios, there was actually a negative relationship such that those who endorsed colorblindness highly were likely to label ambiguous scenarios as very unlikely to be the result of racism.

Model 2 added the psychological and experiential variables ethnic identification, other group orientation, and interracial exposure. While Model 2 significantly predicted attributions of racism in ambiguous scenarios, $F(7,278) = 5.92, p < .001$, Model 2 did not significantly improve on model one's predictive power, $F_{\text{change}}(3,278) = 1.51, p > .05$. Only one of the added variables in this model was significantly predictive of racial ideology. Higher levels of ethnic identification were predictive of lower attributions of racism in ambiguous scenarios, $t(285) = -1.99, p < .05$.

Model 3 added the two racial ideologies: Multiculturalism and colorblindness. Model 3 significantly predicted attributions of racism in ambiguous scenarios, $F(9,276) = 13.83, p < .001$. Model 3 significantly improved on the previous two models' predictive power, $F_{\text{change}}(2,276) = 36.28, p > .001$. The model explained 31.1% ($R = .311$) of variance in attributions of racism in ambiguous scenarios. Only one of the two added racial ideology variables was significantly

predictive of attributions of racism in ambiguous scenarios. Strong endorsement of colorblind racial ideology was predictive of significantly lower attributions of racism in ambiguous scenarios, $t(285) = -7.53, p < .001$.

The second of the two regressions focused on incidents of blatant racism. Hypothesis IV predicted that Endorsement of colorblind ideology would predict participants being less likely to correctly identify cases of blatant racial discrimination, whereas endorsement of multicultural ideology would predict greater accuracy in identifying blatant racism. The dependent variable for these regressions was racist attributions for blatant scenarios. The independent variables were entered in three sequential blocks. The first block included demographic variables age, education, political ideology, and racial composition of neighborhood. The second block added the psychological and experiential variables ethnic identification, other group orientation, and interracial exposure. The third block added the two racial ideologies colorblindness and multiculturalism. The full results of the regression are detailed in Table 13 on the following page.

Table 14. Predictors of Racist Attributions in Blatant Scenarios.

		B	SE B	B	T	F	R ²	ΔR ²
Model 1	Constant	18.00	1.21		14.93***	8.46***	.11	
	Age	0.06	0.02	0.22	3.77***			
	Education	-0.27	0.15	-0.10	-1.84			
	Political Ideology	0.48	0.12	0.23	4.09***			
	Racial Composition	0.01	0.01	0.07	1.23			
Model 2	Constant	19.12	1.82		10.48***	13.10***	.25	.14***
	Age	0.05	0.02	0.16	2.94**			
	Education	-0.25	0.14	-0.10	-1.81			
	Political Ideology	0.26	0.12	0.13	2.24*			
	Racial Composition	0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.39			
	Interracial Exposure	-0.10	0.02	-0.35	-5.69***			
	Ethnic Identification	-0.04	0.02	-0.10	-1.87			
	Other Group Orientation	0.29	0.05	0.36	6.16***			
Model 3	Constant	16.48	2.56		6.43***	16.54***	.35	.10***
	Age	0.05	0.02	0.16	3.23**			
	Education	-0.22	0.13	-0.08	-1.67			
	Political Ideology	-0.07	0.12	-0.03	-0.57			
	Racial Composition	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.04			
	Interracial Exposure	-0.08	0.02	-0.28	-4.80***			
	Ethnic Identification	-0.05	0.02	-0.13	-2.35**			
	Other Group Orientation	0.09	0.06	0.11	1.63			
	Colorblindness	-0.03	0.02	-0.11	-1.68			
	Multiculturalism	0.15	0.03	0.38	4.95***			

* Significant at the 0.05 level. **.Significant at the 0.01 level. *** Significant at the .001 level.

Model 1, based on the four demographic variables, significantly predicted attributions of racism in blatant scenarios, $F(4,281) = 8.46, p < .001$. The R^2 value indicated that the demographic variables explained 10.8% of the variance in racist attributions in blatant scenarios. Two of the four demographic variables in model 1 were significant predictors of racist attributions in blatant scenarios. Age was predictive of racist attributions in blatant scenarios, so that as age increased so did the likelihood an individual would label an blatantly racist situation as being based in racism, $t(284) = 3.77, p < .001$. Political ideology was predictive of racist

attributions in blatant scenarios, so that the more liberal an individual was the more likely they were to label an blatantly racist situation as being based in racism, $t(284) = 4.09, p < .001$.

Model 2 added the psychological and experiential variables ethnic identification, other group orientation, and interracial exposure. Model 2 significantly predicted attributions of racism in blatant scenarios, $F(7,278) = 13.10, p < .001$. Model 2 significantly improved on model one's predictive power, $F_{\text{change}}(3,278) = 17.32, p > .001$. Two of the three psychological and experimental variables were significant predictors of attributions of racism in blatant scenarios. Higher interracial exposure was predictive of lower likelihood of attributing racism to blatant scenarios, $t(284) = -5.70, p < .001$, while higher other group orientation was predictive of higher likelihood of attributing racism to blatant scenarios, $t(284) = 6.16, p < .001$.

Model 3 added the two racial ideologies multiculturalism and colorblindness. Model 3 significantly predicted attributions of racism in blatant scenarios, $F(9,276) = 16.54, p < .001$. Model 3 significantly improved on the previous two models' predictive power, $F_{\text{change}}(2,276) = 21.74, p > .001$. The model explained 35% ($R^2 = .350$) of variance in attributions of racism in blatant scenarios. Only one of the two added racial ideology variables was significantly predictive of attributions of racism in blatant scenarios. Strong endorsement of multicultural racial ideology was predictive of significantly higher attributions of racism in blatant scenarios, $t(285) = 4.95, p > .001$. The findings that endorsement of multiculturalism predicts higher attributions of racism in blatant scenarios and endorsement of colorblind ideology is not a significant predictor of attribution of racism in blatant scenarios supports the claims found in hypotheses IV.

Discussion

The current study seeks to better understand racial ideologies in contemporary US culture. To that end it investigated the factors that influence the development of racial ideology; the characteristics of the two dominate conceptualizations of racial ideology, and the implications of those ideologies for making racial attributions. Race is an ever present element of American life, the popular narratives around race range from the notion that race plays no part in modern life to deep concerns regarding cultural experiences. Many of our popular notions regarding race relations exist outside the findings of empirical literature. In order to better inform discussions of race, this study has investigated some of the contentious elements of our understanding of racial ideology and race relations.

Findings

The current study's findings can be divided into three key areas; the development of racial ideology, the conceptualizations of racial ideology, and the impact of racial ideology. Each of the three areas is explored below.

Development of Racial Ideology

This study considered several potential predictors of racial ideology. These factors included demographic, experiential, psychological, and community level variables. Correlational analysis of the relationships between these variables and multicultural and colorblind ideologies yielded several factors whose variance was significantly correlated to variance in racial ideology. Those variables were political ideology, income, ethnic identification, and other group orientation. Contrary to expectation several of the collected variables were not correlated with

racial ideology and were therefore dropped from the analysis. These variables included age, education, the racial composition of a respondent's zip code area, and interracial exposure.

A hierarchical regression revealed that three of the four significantly correlated variables significantly predicted endorsement of colorblindness. Together, political ideology, household income, ethnic identification, and other group orientation explained 36% of the variance in endorsement of colorblindness. The same four factors predicted 47% of the variance in endorsement of multiculturalism.

The strongest individual predictor of endorsement of colorblind ideology was political ideology. As hypothesized, individuals who identified as more conservative were more likely to endorse colorblindness. This was mirrored in the analysis of endorsement of multiculturalism which found endorsement of multiculturalism increased as participants identified as more liberal. These findings are consistent with past findings that relate colorblindness to conservative views on race (Carr, 1997) and consistent with Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich's (2011) appraisal of the response of conservatives to an African American president. Bonilla-Silva argued that the increased visibility of African American racial progress represented by an African American president would lead to reactionary expression of colorblindness in politically conservative individuals (2011). This position is consistent with the findings of Knowles and colleagues (2009) discussed previously that Caucasians faced with challenges to the racial status quo demonstrate an endorsement of colorblindness in response.

The more an individual expressed an orientation to other (racial) groups the less likely they were to endorse colorblind ideology and the more likely they were to endorse multiculturalism. This finding is in keeping with the study's hypothesis that interest in exploring other racial groups would be predictive of increased multicultural endorsement over

colorblindness. Moreover, this is theoretically consistent with Plaut and colleagues' (2011) finding that White participants were most likely to endorse multiculturalism when they felt that multiculturalism was inclusive of them. Participants who feel strongly allied with (or oriented towards) other racial groups are likely to feel more a part of the conceptualization of diversity.

This other group orientation is separate from both multiracial exposure and community racial composition in that it is not approaching diversity from a numerical perspective. . Both the measure of multiracial exposure (MEI) and the community racial composition metric focus on numeric ratios of diversity. In the MEI for example participants are responding on the ratio of individuals in a myriad of situations who are the same or of other races than their own. Similarly the community racial composition metric captures the percent of respondent's zip code that is White, non-Hispanic. These metric's focus on numeric diversity may fail to capture respondent's perceptions of diversity. The other groups orientation scale instead focuses on those perceptions.

The other group orientation measure asks participants, for example, if they, "like meeting and getting to know individuals from ethnic groups other than my [their] own". This is a different standard. It is quite possible that participants who indicated strong other group orientation still operate within settings that are majority White, but that does not mean that they necessarily feel that they do not seek out or embrace other racial groups. This difference helps explain why other group orientation is a very strong predictor of racial ideology in this study despite the fact that multiracial exposure was not supported as a significant predictor of colorblindness or multiculturalism.

Finally, stronger ethnic identification predicted both higher endorsement of colorblindness and higher endorsement of multiculturalism. This seemingly paradoxical finding would seem to be based on diverse meanings race can play in the lives of individuals. Phinney

(1992) proposed ethnic identification as being comprised of three sub factors; affirmation and belonging, identity achievement, and ethnic behaviors. Follow-up analyses of these subscales relationships seem to explain the divergence seen in the impact of strong ethnic identification.

Affirmation and belonging in Phinney's model refers to the notion of ethnic pride and community (1992). Individuals high in affirmation and belonging have positive feelings towards their ethnic group and feel a strong sense of belonging to that group. Follow up analyses suggest that ethnic identity affirmation and belonging is strongly related to a preference of colorblindness over multiculturalism. The notion that Caucasian individuals who highly identify with their ethnic group and feel strong affiliation with that group would endorse colorblindness is not necessarily surprising. While the tenants of colorblindness would seem to indicate that advocates seek affiliation based on factors other than race and ethnicity, findings of previous research studies paint a more nuanced picture.

As Plaut and colleagues (2011) pointed out, many Caucasians feel excluded by multiculturalism. These feelings of exclusion would seem to stem from the larger cultural notion that dominant social identities are somehow outside the bounds of diversity and instead act as a cultural norm from which other identities differ (Sue, 1993). Feeling excluded from the notion of diversity would provide a logical explanation for the established relationship. Caucasian participants with a strong sense of belonging within their Caucasian identity may very well resist the idea of multiculturalism if they see it as a model which excludes or diminishes them or their identity.

Phinney proposed identity achievement as a measure of the maturity of an individual's sense of ethnic identity (1992). This development can range from an individual leaving their identity relatively unexplored to having a well-developed sense of the role of one's ethnic

identity as a part of their overall identity. Follow up analyses suggested that strong identity achievement was related to higher endorsement of multiculturalism and lower endorsement of colorblindness. The idea that Caucasian individuals with strong sense of the role ethnicity plays in their identity would be more supportive of multiculturalism would seem consistent with the conceptualization of multiculturalism. To have a mature ethnic identity would suggest an understanding of the importance and value of the role of ethnicity. Such a view would mesh with the multicultural notion that race and ethnicity is a vital component of one's experience. Moreover, valuing ethnicity's contribution to one's identity would seem to encourage an understanding of Caucasian identity as a unique and meaningful experience. Such an attitude would, arguably, increase the likelihood that an individual would see their Caucasian identity as a form of racial diversity as opposed to somehow existing outside of racial diversity. As Plaut and colleagues (2011) established, this identification within the diversity spectrum would encourage a multicultural world view over colorblindness.

Conceptualizing Racial Ideology

Past research has generally treated colorblind and multicultural ideologies as two competing viewpoints. This is most apparent in studies that manipulate racial ideology through education or instruction (e.g., Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). However some research has indicated that a given ideological approach can be construed to very different ends and that participants may be very fluid in their embrace of ideological positions. The current study attempted to clarify the relationship between colorblindness and multiculturalism.

A correlational analysis indicated that there was a strong negative correlation between endorsement of colorblindness and endorsement of multiculturalism so that as one increased the other decreased. This is in keeping with Ryan and colleagues (2007) findings using their

abbreviated racial ideology scale. However, in their study a factor analysis yielded two discrete factors one for colorblindness and one for multiculturalism. A factor analysis of colorblind (CoBRAS) and multicultural (MASQUE) items in the current study did not yield factors based on ideological orientation. Instead the factor analysis yielded factors based on the underlying sources of those orientations.

A factor analysis of the 47 constituent items of the CoBRAS and MASQUE items yielded 5 underlying factors. These factors largely conformed to the original conceptualizations of the CoBRAS (Neville et al., 2000) and MASQUE (Munroe & Pearson, 2006) measures. The five factors generated by the analysis were; unawareness of racial privilege, institutional discrimination, blatant racial issues, egalitarian action, and cultural sensitivity. Of these 5 factors only one included items from both the CoBRAS and MASQUE measures. This variable was blatant racial issues which Neville and colleagues (2000) conceived as basic awareness of racial inequality. This corresponds well with the factor “to know” described by Munroe and Pearson (2006) that contributed the MASQUE items loading on the blatant racial privilege factor.

The two factors comprised solely of CoBRAS items were unawareness of racial privilege and institutional discrimination. These variables focused on the extent to which a person acknowledged the role race plays in individuals’ lives and the structures which foster inequality. The egalitarian action and cultural sensitivity factors were comprised solely of items from the MASQUE measure. The egalitarian action factor corresponded to the factor, to act, proposed by Munroe and Pearson (2006). It focused on an individual’s willingness to intervene to reduce discrimination. Similarly the cultural sensitivity factor corresponds to a factor identified by Munroe and Pearson as “to care” (2006). This factor includes items regarding an individual’s self-identified effort to respect and understand cultural differences.

These findings seem to indicate that multiculturalism and colorblind ideology largely assess different dimensions of racial ideology with one shared factor and fourth distinct ones. Thus although they do not define poles on a perfect continuum, they are strongly negatively correlated and may share some common underlying structures. The majority of the items on the CoBRAS and MASQUE did not fall into shared underlying factors. This may very well be attributable to the different focuses of the two scales. While both start with the idea of acknowledging racial issues, they diverge from there. The CoBRAS scale focused on investigating different ways of understanding those racial issues, while the MASQUE scale focused on the implications of understanding racial issues with the way individuals then interact with and care about cultural diversity. Given this overall pattern of similarities and differences, a consideration of the two scales together provides a complementary way to understand the nature of racial ideologies.

Impacts of Racial Ideology

Perhaps the most novel component of this study was the attempt to measure the impact of participants' racial ideology on their attributions of racism in both ambiguous and blatant racialized situations. The ambiguous scenario version of this task presented participants with vignettes concerning interpersonal conflict between members of different racial groups without any clear indication that race played a part in the actors' decisions or actions. The participants were asked to gauge the extent to which they felt race played a part in these vignettes. In the final regression model the variables age, education, and colorblindness all significantly predicted attributions of racism in these vignettes. As age and education increased so did the likelihood that participants attributed racism to the ambiguous scenarios.

The relationship between racial ideology and racist attributions in ambiguous scenarios was more complex. Endorsement of colorblind ideology was related to significantly lower attributions of racism in ambiguous scenarios. Endorsement of multiculturalism however was not linked to higher attributions of racism. An analysis of means indicates that individuals high on colorblindness were most likely to indicate that ambiguous scenarios were more likely not based on racism. Individuals moderate or high in multiculturalism were more likely to express equal likelihood that racism played a role in the scenarios. This is an important distinction. As was found in Apfelbaum and colleague's (2010) study of preschoolers, multiculturalism does not seem to lead to an increase in false positive accusations of racism. Colorblindness does however seem to lead to a presumption that race does not play a part in interracial exposure. One possible limitation of Apfelbaum and colleagues findings with children is that the manipulation of racial ideology may be one of very few explicit messages children had received regarding race (2010). Their attributions of racism therefore lack the context of lived experience and broader cultural conversations presumed present in adult appraisals. The findings of the current study indicate that the relationships between racial ideology and racist attributions hold true with adults as well as children, despite the myriad of differences between the two populations.

In the blatant scenarios task participants similarly review vignettes for the likelihood of racism motivating the actors. However, in this task the role of racism in the decisions and actions of the character is obvious. Age was again significantly predictive of racist attributions such that older respondents were more likely to attribute racism to the actions of the actors.

For blatant scenarios strength of ethnic identification was a significant negative predictor of racist attributions, so that the stronger a person identified with their Caucasian ethnicity the less likely they were to attribute racism to these incidents of blatant racism. One possible

explanation of this finding is the effect of positive ingroup sentiment. In the vignettes the protagonist is Caucasian and therefore assumed to be part of the respondent's ingroup. Brewer (1999) has established that we show ingroup members greater latitude in their actions and are more likely to attribute positives to those ingroup members.

Additionally, increased interracial exposure was predictive of lower likelihood of participants identifying blatantly racist scenarios as racist. This is contrary to the study's hypothesis that increased interracial exposure would lead to more sensitivity towards racism. There is some precedent for this finding however as Ryan and colleagues (2007) had found a tendency for Caucasian respondents with high interracial exposure (in this case exposure to African Americans relative to Caucasians) was related to higher endorsement of colorblindness over multiculturalism. While the current study does not produce a definitive explanation for this finding one possible explanation for this finding is that increased interracial exposure might make challenges to the racial status quo more salient to those individuals. In keeping with previous theoretical (Bonilla-Silva, 2003) and empirical (Knowles et al., 2009) work, this perceived threat to racial privilege (made salient by greater interracial exposure) may trigger colorblindness as a defensive reaction to that threat.

In keeping with the study's hypotheses, endorsement of multicultural ideology was a significant predictor of racist attributions in blatant scenarios. Increases in multiculturalism were strongly predictive of increases in racist attributions in blatant scenarios. This again is consistent with Apfelbaum and colleagues' (2010) findings with preschoolers whose racist attributions were tested after being taught about race either from a colorblind or multicultural approach. Colorblindness was not predictive of attributions of racism in scenarios where the role of racism was blatant.

These findings seem to indicate that endorsing multiculturalism is predictive of greater accuracy in detection of racism. Attributions of racism in ambiguous scenarios remained neutral for individuals high in multiculturalism, while being more likely to identify racism in scenarios where it was blatant. While there is nothing intrinsically anti-egalitarian in the tenets of colorblind ideology, these findings support previous research indicating that colorblindness can be utilized in Caucasian respondents to rationalize racism and reinforce the racial inequities in the status quo (Knowles, 2009).

Implications

The findings of the current study have many potential implications for the ways in which we consider race and race relations in the United States. The current findings that high multicultural ideology endorsement is predictive of higher attributions of racism in blatant cases and not predictive of higher attributions of racism in ambiguous cases seems to corroborate previous findings that multiculturalism is related to higher accuracy in such tasks (Apfelbaum, 2010). This flies in the face of current popular culture narratives which point to multiculturalism as a force for creating and reinforcing divisions between Americans (Auster 2004, Auster, 1990). These cultural critics argue that emphasizing diversity creates a feeling of otherness. Explaining interracial conflict through the lens of racism, such a position would contend, promotes divisiveness (Auster, 2004). Similarly, it has been argued that investigating racial divisions and privilege creates a “victim mentality” in which individuals are primed to see racism in situations that have no racial basis (Shapiro, 2015).

Implications for Practice

The empirical support for the multicultural approach to racial ideology would indicate that individuals and organizations seeking to enhance fair and just outcomes would do well to take a multicultural approach. This approach would include decisions in curriculum development around explorations of race in American life at all academic levels. As detailed by Apfelbaum and colleagues (2010) such educational content on race, when present at all, tends to embrace a colorblind approach. There is precious little empirical work, however, that would indicate that a colorblind approach best serves the goal of racial justice. The current findings support the notion of embracing multicultural perspective in order to promote egalitarianism. This is notable in an era in which some states have actively discouraged multicultural conversations, some going so far as to ban cultural studies courses within their public schools (Camarota & Aguilera, 2012). With studies supporting the positive impact of multicultural education in elementary schools (Apfelbaum et al., 2010) and in institutions of higher education (Neville et al., 2014) it would seem clear that such an approach is preferable.

The current findings, in chorus with the growing body of literature around racial ideology, have similar implications for public policy. While colorblindness has been the default assumption of much public policy (Apfelbaum et al., 2012; Apfelbaum et al., 2010) empirical evidence, including the current study, indicate that the underlying assumptions that race neutral policies promote racial equality are not supported. In the Supreme Court's decision in the case, *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1*, Chief Justice John Roberts proclaimed that, "The way to stop discrimination based on race, is to stop discriminating based on race" (2007). Robert's majority opinion emphasized a colorblind approach to race. The

decision mirrors the cultural criticism that multiculturalism fosters divisiveness and encourages racial discrimination.

However Chief Justice Roberts' opinion overlooks the real role that racism plays in the lived experiences of individuals and ignores the historical and political context in which race conscious policies (in this case Affirmative Action) occur (Turner, 2015). His opinion assumes that race neutral policies serve to reduce racism, a claim largely unsupported in the literature. The current study builds on long line of literature which suggests racism cannot only survive despite colorblindness but actually thrives within such an ideology. As Carlos Bonilla-Silva argued in *Racism without Racists* (2003), and supported by most subsequent research, colorblindness allows for the maintenance of racial inequality by shifting the explanations of extant inequalities into race neutral explanations.

Implications for Theory

The bulk of extant research on racial ideology has treated colorblind and multicultural ideology as opposing ends of a continuum. While the current study could be construed as lending some support to this notion, there is far more to be done to understand the complex relationship between the two. Moreover, the emergent, orthogonal factors generated by this study indicate the multifaceted nature of racial ideology. The majority of research to this point has focused on cognition, thinking of race as influential and understanding the impacts of race on lived experience. However, there are interpersonal elements to racial ideology that have less often been explored. It is one thing to intellectually comprehend the role of race and racism in lived experience; it is another thing to extend that understanding into sensitivity and action.

The current study's findings around Ethnic Identification highlight the complex nature of Ethnic Identification with the lives of Caucasian Americans. White identity has been the subject

of comparatively little research compared to racial identity formation within racial minorities (Todd et al., 2010). The current study demonstrates the divergent ways in which ethnic identification can inform the ways in which individuals interface with race in attributions. The development of theory around White ethnic identity must accommodate the multiple roles which ethnicity can play in individual's lives and seek to better understand the psychological and environmental factors that may moderate the relationship between that identity and interracial attitudes and actions.

Strengths and Limitations

The current study sought to provide a systematic overview of racial ideology, its development, conceptualization, and impact. To that end this study provides the most comprehensive analysis of the predictors of racial ideology formation to date. This analysis included variables at the demographic, experiential, psychological, and community domains. By integrating a wide variety of variables, the current study can both explore potential connections and analyze the relative contributions of multiple factors in the presence of the overall model. In order to investigate these numerous variables, however, it was necessary to limit the current study to Caucasian participants. Previous studies looking at racial differences in ideology formation and endorsement amongst Caucasians and African Americans (Knowles, 2009; Ryan et al., 2007) and Latinos (Ryan et al., 2010) indicate that patterns of racial identity endorsement may look very different between different racial and ethnic populations.

While limiting the current study to Caucasians succeeds in exploring the experience in Caucasians, it is unable to comment on the degree to which these findings would relate to the experiences of other racial or ethnic groups. Similarly, it is not possible to directly extrapolate the current findings to the racial experiences outside of the US. While racial identity and

ideology are worldwide concerns, each country's demographic, historical, and political contexts produce a uniqueness of racial experience, race relations, and notions of both. Although there is a rich body of research on multiculturalism in northern Europe and Canada (Kymlicka 2010; Verkuyten, 2005), the applicability of the current study to those contexts should be done, if it is applied at all, with a fair degree of caution.

Methodologically the current study's utilization of Amazon Mechanical Turk allowed for the collection of a large, geographically diverse U.S. sample of Caucasian Americans. This sample was more diverse in political ideology, income, education, and age than a student subject pool could have allowed for. With that noted, the diversity in the current study population is still far from a representative sample of Caucasian Americans. Politically liberal and adults under 30 were both overrepresented in the sample, while conservatives and adults over 45 years of age were underrepresented. Moreover the nature of a fully online data collection methodology (recruitment and data collection) inherently limited the inclusion of those with low computer literacy or limited access to online enabled devices. It is worth noting that while there is not data on the device type used to complete the AMT survey, both the Qualtrix survey software and the AMT web platform allowed for the use of mobile devices and tablets. Allowing for the use of phones and tablets does, at least theoretically, lower the barrier to possible inclusion in the study.

At a conceptual level self-report questionnaires always have the potential for respondancy biases such as social desirability. The wide range of scores recorded for most constituent measures would seem to indicate that participants' responses were not overly skewed based on desirability of certain response patterns. Specific to this study is the concern regarding the conflation of some constituent measures in respondents' conceptualization of the terms. There is a tendency for respondents to lump racial ideology together with political ideology that

may explain at least some of the observed relationship between political conservatism and colorblind racial ideology (Jost et al., 2003; Neville, et al., 2001).

Future Directions

There are several potential future directions for research on racial ideology. These studies could serve to expand and enhance the current findings. As previously explained, the limitation of participants to Caucasians in the current study allowed for a focus on the unique pattern of racial identity formation within the European American experience. This focus could be expanded by integrating more variables related to that experience.

While the CoBRAS measure captures “Awareness of Racial Privilege” as a sub factor of colorblindness, tailored instruments like the White Privilege Attitude Scale could help deepen the current studies understanding of the process of racial ideology in Caucasian Americans. Similarly, the intensifying discussion of so called “reverse” racism against Caucasians in the popular media could be integrated into future work. It is unclear how a participant’s subscription to the idea of increased discrimination against Caucasians would relate to racial ideology. While measures incorporated in the current study touch briefly on such ideas there could be a much more explicit study about attitudes around anti-White racism. The current study would seem to indicate that a belief in increasing discrimination against Whites is related, at least in part, to endorsement of colorblind ideology. This is consistent with past research indicating that colorblindness is more heavily endorsed when Caucasian participants feel the racial status quo is being threatened (Knowles et al., 2009). Future work could explore this relationship in depth and perhaps take steps to better understand differences and overlap between colorblind ideology and more specific attitudes around race relations in the United States.

While deepening the current study's exploration of the Caucasian experience is beneficial, another important future direction would be to expand the study's methodology to other racial and ethnic groups. Such analyses would allow for similar exploration of the racialized experiences of those groups. Additionally, studies on multiracial/multiethnic populations would allow for comparison of the similarities and differences in those patterns. Especially important would be investigations of populations less commonly addressed in the existing racial ideology literature. The majority of this literature focuses on Caucasians, African Americans, or a comparison of the two. Expansion to racial and ethnic groups such as Latinos, Asian Americans, Arab Americans, Native Americans, and multiracial individuals could do much to expand our understanding of the US racial experience.

The current study employed a method of testing racist attributions in blatantly racist situations and ambiguous situations. This allowed for the study to examine the possibility that multicultural ideology may predispose holders to being overly sensitive to racism thereby producing "false positives". One potential addition to this study would be adding a third subset of the Racist Attributions Task, Non-Racist. These scenarios would include cross cultural conflicts as in the Ambiguous and Blatant subsets, but would provide clear, plausible explanations for that conflict other than race. This additional consideration would increase sensitivity to "false positives" and allow for another domain of comparison in attributions of racism.

Finally, given the relative newness of examination of white racial identity future studies would likely benefit from mixed-method approaches which could more responsively capture the phenomenological experience of whiteness. Emergent methods will go a long way to

complementing and precipitating empirical studies in their exploration of what is still an area of comparatively small academic consideration.

Conclusions

The current study contributes to the existing literature by supporting the findings of past studies as well as expanding on that literature. The current study expanded the consideration of the factors influencing the formation of racial ideology by expanding the considered factors beyond individual and psychological factors. Analyses of the relative contribution of demographic, experiential, psychological, and community factors in the development of racial ideology pointed to a few key predictors. Political ideology and other group orientation stood out as strong, consistent predictors of racial ideology. These findings largely supported previous research indicating that political liberalism and a predisposition to exploring other cultures related to increased endorsement of multiculturalism. Conservatism and a disinterest in exploring other cultures, conversely, predicted higher endorsement of colorblindness.

In a much different pattern, ethnic identification's contribution to racial ideology was more nuanced. Higher endorsement led, seemingly contradictorily, to both to higher endorsement of multiculturalism and of colorblindness. Unpacking ethnic identification helped elucidate the nature of this seemingly paradoxical relationship. Examining the constituent subscales that comprised ethnic identification found that they accounted for this divergent pattern. Participants who felt a strong sense of pride and belonging with their Caucasian identity (affinity and belonging subscale) were more likely to endorse colorblindness. Participants who had a well-developed (as opposed to a relatively unexplored) understanding of the role their ethnic identity played in their overall ethnic identity (identity achievement) were conversely more likely to endorse multiculturalism. This highlights the complexity of notions such as ethnic identification.

Strong identification with ones' ethnic identity can take a variety of forms, each with very different implications for attitudes and beliefs for race relations.

Analyses conducted to explore the exact relationship between endorsement of colorblind and multicultural ideology produced mixed results. On one hand there was limited support to the idea that these two approaches do stand on opposite, though not necessarily polar, ends of the ideological spectrum. Measures of each ideological orientation indicated that endorsement of colorblindness and endorsement of multiculturalism were strongly negatively correlated. Factor analysis of the racial ideology metrics did indicate one common factor which shared by both ideological stances, blatant racial issues. However, the majority of the factors developed through the factor analysis were not shared. These factors; unawareness of racial privilege, institutional discrimination, egalitarian action, and racial sensitivity each consisted solely of items from one of the two scales. While these factors provide a framework for understanding racial ideology, it is unclear whether their separation by measure is a reflection of differences in the ideological stances or products of the way the two instruments capture those stances.

There has been little research to date on the role racial ideology plays in individual's perceptions of racism. This study indicates that, in keeping with past research on children and theoretical work, colorblindness seems to negatively impact individual's ability to correctly identify racism (Apfelbaum et al., 2010). Colorblindness was related to lower attributions of racism in both Blatant and Ambiguous cases. Conversely multicultural ideology endorsement was predictive of a greater likelihood of attributing racism to instances in which blatant racism occurred. Contrary to criticisms of multicultural ideology endorsement of multiculturalism was not predictive of increases in attributions of racism in ambiguous scenarios.

The current study provides a systematic overview of the manifestation of racial ideology in the Caucasian American experience. As many empirical and theoretical studies before it, the current study's findings support the primacy of multicultural ideology as a force for egalitarian race relations over colorblindness. While colorblindness is theoretically a force for egalitarianism the current study, consistent with past research, indicates that colorblindness accompanies a tendency to ignore real instances of racial discrimination. In an increasingly racially charged culture these findings provide a small indication of the forces underlying debates about the role(s) race does and should play in the lives of Americans.

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Appendix A: Eligibility Questionnaire

Eligibility Questionnaire

In order to establish your eligibility for this study, please answer the following 5 questions as honestly as possible.

My first language is English

Yes No

I live in one of the 50 states in the United States of America.

Yes No

I am over the age of 18

Yes No

I am able to dedicate the next hour to completing the survey.

Yes No

Do you identify as Hispanic or Latino?

Yes No

What racial group do you identify as?

- A. American Indian or Alaska Native
- B. Asian
- C. African American
- D. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
- E. White
- F. Biracial/Multiracial
- G. Other

Appendix B: Informed Consent

Informed Consent

Research Participant Consent Form for Identity and Society

I. Purpose of the research study

Robert E. Gutierrez is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Psychology at DePaul University. You are invited to participate in a research study he is conducting. The purpose of this research study is to understand how people think about race, both in terms of their own identity but also the importance of race in society as a whole.

II. What you will be asked to do

If you decide to be in this study, you will be asked answer a set of questions that relate to your identity and your opinions on a variety of social issues. Your participation in this study will take approximately 1 hour.

III. Foreseeable risks or discomforts

There is minimal risk to participating in this study. You may feel uncomfortable answering questions about race and identity; however, the information you provide is anonymous and you are free to withdraw from participation at any time. You are also free to not answer any questions that you do not feel comfortable answering.

IV. Benefits

While there is no direct benefit to you from participating in this study, the indirect benefit of participating will be knowing that you helped researchers better understand how people respond to these pictures.

V. Confidentiality

You will not be asked to provide your name at any time during the survey. Any information provided will remain confidential and kept in a protected computer file for a minimum of five years. All data collected from you will be coded with a random number. The results of this research project may be made public and

information quoted in professional journals and meetings, but information from this study will only be reported for groups and not for individuals.

VI. Compensation

If you participate in the study, the researcher will give you \$1.00 through your MTurk account.

VII. Voluntary Nature of this Research

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You do not have to participate and you can refuse to answer any question or quit at any time. You can withdraw from this study at any time without penalty.

VIII. Contact Information

If you have any questions about this research, you may contact:

If you have any questions regarding the questionnaire, please contact Robert Gutierrez at rgutier6@depaul.edu. You may also contact the Institutional Review Board at DePaul University at xxx-xxx-xxxx to report problems or concerns related to this study.

I have **read and understand** this form, and consent to the research it describes to me.

If you consent to participate, please click “continue” below.

Appendix C: Demographic Questionnaire

Demographics

The following questions are meant to better understand the participants in the study. Please answer honestly.

1. Gender

- ☐ Female
- ☐ Male
- ☐ Other

2. What is your current age? _____

3. What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed?

- ☐ Less than high school
- ☐ High school graduate (includes equivalency)
- ☐ Some college, no degree
- ☐ Associate's degree
- ☐ Bachelor's degree
- ☐ M.A., M.S., or professional degree
- ☐ Ph.D.

4. What is your marital status (check all that apply)?

- ☐ Single (never married)
- ☐ Married
- ☐ Separated
- ☐ Widowed
- ☐ Divorced

5. Which of the following best describes your political affiliation?

- ☐ Democrat
- ☐ Republican
- ☐ Independent
- ☐ Tea Party
- ☐ Green Party
- ☐ Libertarian
- ☐ Socialist
- ☐ Non Political
- ☐ Other

Please specify: _____

6. Which of the following best describes your political ideology?

- ☐ Very conservative
- ☐ Conservative
- ☐ Lean conservative
- ☐ Moderate
- ☐ Lean liberal
- ☐ Liberal
- ☐ Very liberal

7. What was your total household income before taxes during the past 12 months?

- ☐ Less than \$25,000
- ☐ \$25,000 to \$34,999
- ☐ 35,000 to \$49,999
- ☐ \$50,000 to \$74,999
- ☐ \$75,000 to \$99,999
- ☐ \$100,000 to \$149,999
- ☐ \$150,000 to \$199,999
- ☐ \$200,000 or more

8. In what zip code do you currently reside?

9. In what zip code did you spend largest portion of your childhood?

- ☐ I do not know/remember my childhood zip code

Appendix D: Multiracial Exposure Inventory (Adapted from Ramirez, 1998)

For the following items please indicate the answer choice which best represents the racial composure of setting described in the item.

1. The ethnic composition of the neighborhood in which I lived during childhood was...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

2. The ethnic composition of the neighborhood in which I lived during adolescence was...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

3. The ethnic composition of the neighborhood in which I currently live is...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

4. My childhood friends who visited my home and related well to my parents were...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

5. The teachers and counselors with whom I have had the closest relationships have been...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

6. The people who have most influenced me in my education have been...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

7. In high school, my close friends were...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

8. The ethnic backgrounds of the people I have dated have been...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

9. In the job(s) I have had, my close friends have been...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

10. The people with whom I have established close meaningful relationships have been...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

11. At present, my close friends are...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

12. My close friends at work are (were)...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

13. I enjoy going to gatherings at which the people are...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

14. When I study or work on a project with others, I am usually with persons who are...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

15. When I am involved in group discussions where I am expected to participate, I prefer a group of people who are...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

16. I am active in organizations or social groups in which the majority of the members are...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

17. When I am with my friends, I usually attend functions where the people are...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

18. When I discuss personal problems or issues, I discuss them with people who are...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my own

19. I most often spend time with people who are...

1	2	3	4	5
Mostly of the same race as me	More of the same race as me than not	About equally of my race and of other races than my own	More of other races than of my own	Mostly all of races other than my ow

Appendix E: Color-Blind Racial Attributions Scale (CoBRAS)

For each of the following items please indicate the extent to which you agree with that item.
(* indicates reverse scored items)

White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Race is very important in determining who is successful and who is not.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Race plays an important role in who gets sent to prison.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Race plays a major role in the type of social services (such as type of health care or day care) that people receive in the U.S.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Racial and ethnic minorities do not have the same opportunities as white people in the U.S.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Everyone who works hard, no matter what race they are, has an equal chance to become rich.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

White people are more to blame for racial discrimination than racial and ethnic minorities.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly against white people.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

White people in the U.S. are discriminated against because of the color of their skin.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

English should be the only official language in the U.S.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Due to racial discrimination, programs such as affirmative action are necessary to help create equality.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

It is important that people begin to think of themselves as American and not African American, Mexican American or Italian American.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Immigrants should try to fit into the culture and values of the U.S.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Talking about racial issues causes unnecessary tension.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Racism is a major problem in the U.S.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

It is important for public schools to teach about the history and contributions of racial and ethnic minorities.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

It is important for political leaders to talk about racism to help work through or solve society's problems.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Racism may have been a problem in the past, it is not an important problem today.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Appendix F: Munroe Multicultural Attitude Scale Questionnaire (MASQUE)

For each of the following items indicate the extent to which you agree with the statement being made. A score of 1 indicates that you strongly disagree with the statement, while a score of 6 indicates that you strongly agree with the statement. (* indicates reverse scored).

1. I realize that racism exists.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

2. I know that social barriers exist.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

3. I understand religious beliefs differ.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

4. I understand sexual preferences may differ.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

5. I understand that gender-based inequities exist.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

6. I accept the fact that languages other than English are spoken.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

7. I do not understand why people of other cultures act differently.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

8. I am sensitive to respecting religious differences.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

9. I am sensitive to differing expressions of ethnicity.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

10. I am emotionally concerned about racial inequality.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

11. I am sensitive toward people of every financial status.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

12. I am not sensitive to language uses other than English. <REVERSE SCORED>

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

13. I do not act to stop racism. <REVERSE SCORED>

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

14. I actively challenge gender inequities.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

15. I do not actively respond to contest religious prejudice. <REVERSE SCORED>

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

16. I respectfully help others to offset language barriers that prevent communication.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

17. I do not take action when witnessing bias based on people's preferred sexual orientation.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

Appendix G: Multi-group Ethnic Identification Measure (MEIM))

In this country people come from a lot of different cultures and there are many different words to describe the different backgrounds or ethnic groups that people come from. Some examples of ethnic groups are Mexican American, Hispanic, African American, Asian American, American Indian, Caucasian and White.

Every person is born into an ethnic group, or sometimes two groups, but people differ on how important their ethnicity is to them, how they feel about it, and how much their behavior is affected by it. These questions are about your ethnicity or your ethnic group and how you feel about it or react to it.

Please fill in:

In terms of ethnic group, I consider myself to be _____

For each of the following items indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.

1. I have spent time trying to find out more about my own ethnic group, such as its history, traditions, and customs.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

2. I am active in organizations or social groups that include mostly members of my own ethnic group.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

3. I have a clear sense of my ethnic background and what it means for me.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

4. I like meeting and getting to know people from ethnic groups other than my own.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

5. I think a lot about how my life will be affected by my ethnic group membership.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

6. I am happy that I am a member of the group I belong to.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

7. I sometimes feel it would be better if different ethnic groups didn't try to mix together.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

8. I am not very clear about the role of my ethnicity in my life.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

9. I often spend time with people from ethnic groups other than my own.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

10. I really have not spent much time trying to learn more about the culture and history of my ethnic group.*

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

11. I have a strong sense of belonging to my own ethnic group.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

12. I understand pretty well what my ethnic group membership means to me, in terms of how to relate to my own group and other groups.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly
Disagree				Agree

13. In order to learn more about my ethnic background, I have often talked to other people about my ethnic group.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

14. I have a lot of pride in my ethnic group and its accomplishments.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

15. I don't try to become friends with people from other ethnic groups.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

16. I participate in cultural practices of my own group, such as special food, music, or customs.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

17. I am involved in activities with people from other ethnic groups.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

18. I feel a strong attachment towards my own ethnic group.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

19. I enjoy being around people from ethnic groups other than my own.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

20. I feel good about my cultural or ethnic background.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

21. My ethnicity is...

1. Asian American, Pacific Islander, Native Hawaiian
2. African American, Black, African
3. Latino, Hispanic, Chicano
4. Caucasian, European America, White (not Hispanic)
5. Native American, American Indian
6. Multiracial, Biracial
7. Other

22. My father's ethnicity is...

1. Asian American, Pacific Islander, Native Hawaiian
2. African American, Black, African
3. Latino, Hispanic, Chicano
4. Caucasian, European America, White (not Hispanic)
5. Native American, American Indian
6. Multiracial, Biracial
7. Other

23. My mother's ethnicity is...

1. Asian American, Pacific Islander, Native Hawaiian
2. African American, Black, African
3. Latino, Hispanic, Chicano
4. Caucasian, European America, White (not Hispanic)
5. Native American, American Indian
6. Multiracial, Biracial
7. Other

Appendix H: Racist Attributions Task (RAT)

Read each of the following scenarios. For each scenario, after considering the information, please rate the extent which you think racism was present in the actions of the characters. (* indicates “ambiguous racism” vignette, † indicates “blatant racism” vignette).

1.* One evening Edgar and James, both African American men, were in a car driving through a suburban neighborhood. Out of their rearview mirror they observed that a police officer had his lights on and was signaling them to pull over. When Officer McMahon, a White man in his 40’s approached the window, he explained that they were being pulled over for exceeding the speed limit by 3 miles per hour.

1	2	3	4	5
Racism was absolutely not a factor	Racism probably was not a factor	Racism may have been a factor	Racism probably was a factor	Racism was definitely a factor

2.† Jane, an African American woman, had just moved in to her new dorm room. After getting situated she joined a group of students in the lounge area. One of the students was talking about how she wished her best friend, whom she had hoped to room with, would have been accepted to the university. After a while she turned to Jane and told her how lucky she was that she was able to get accepted because of Affirmative Action.

1	2	3	4	5
Racism was absolutely not a factor	Racism probably was not a factor	Racism may have been a factor	Racism probably was a factor	Racism was definitely a factor

3.* To celebrate their wedding anniversary Grace and Henry, an African American couple, decided to have dinner at a very nice restaurant in town. Feliz, a White waiter, informed them that they would have to wait approximately 30 minutes for a table. After they had been waiting 20 minutes, a White couple enters the restaurant, approaches the hostess, and is seated immediately.

1	2	3	4	5
Racism was absolutely not a factor	Racism probably was not a factor	Racism may have been a factor	Racism probably was a factor	Racism was definitely a factor

4.* While standing in line at a department store Anne, an African American female customer, noticed that Tina, the clerk, did not ask the White woman in front of her for identification after making an expensive purchase on a credit card. When she approached the clerk to pay for her purchases, she was immediately asked for identification when she pulled out her credit card.

1	2	3	4	5
Racism was absolutely not a factor	Racism probably was not a factor	Racism may have been a factor	Racism probably was a factor	Racism was definitely a factor

5.† When Alex asked his dad why several men were lined up outside the hardware store, his father told him that it was because Mexicans were too lazy to get real jobs.

1	2	3	4	5
Racism was absolutely not a factor	Racism probably was not a factor	Racism may have been a factor	Racism probably was a factor	Racism was definitely a factor

6.† Susan, an older White woman was telling her friends at church how happy she was that her daughter had recently gotten engaged. The women all congratulated her. When Penny took out her phone to show a picture of her daughter and her future son in law, an African American man, one of her friends stopped smiling. After a brief pause her friend said that is wasn't right for people to be "mixing races".

1	2	3	4	5
Racism was absolutely not a factor	Racism probably was not a factor	Racism may have been a factor	Racism probably was a factor	Racism was definitely a factor

7.*After work, several Hispanic men were driving home in a truck, and the driver did not use a turn signal at a small intersection. They were pulled over by a White police officer, who then issued them a traffic violation for failing to signal at an intersection.

1	2	3	4	5
Racism was absolutely not a factor	Racism probably was not a factor	Racism may have been a factor	Racism probably was a factor	Racism was definitely a factor

8.† After getting rear ended on his way to work Drew, a White lawyer, came out to inspect the damage. Upon seeing Helen, an Asian teenager, Drew exasperatedly muttered that it figured that an Asian would have hit him.

1	2	3	4	5
Racism was absolutely not a factor	Racism probably was not a factor	Racism may have been a factor	Racism probably was a factor	Racism was definitely a factor

9.† Penny, a White mother of two, took her son to his soccer game. When she noticed that several of the players on the other team were African American, she warned her son to be careful because, "black kids play dirty".

1	2	3	4	5
Racism was absolutely not a factor	Racism probably was not a factor	Racism may have been a factor	Racism probably was a factor	Racism was definitely a factor

10.* Two White coworkers were walking to lunch when they passed a middle-aged African America man asking for change on the corner. After they passed the man, coworker 1 said maybe they should have given him some money. Coworker 2 responded that it was better they did not as the homeless man would have just spent it on alcohol.

1
Racism was
absolutely not a
factor

2
Racism probably
was not a factor

3
Racism may have
been a factor

4
Racism probably
was a factor

5
Racism was
definitely a
factor

Appendix I: Debriefing Form

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study! The general purpose of this research is to better understand the ways in which people think about race in their everyday life.

In this study, you were asked to answer questions regarding your experience with both your own and other races/ethnicity, about your own thinking around race, and asked to assess sample situations for the presence of racism.

The results from this study will allow the research team to better understand what factors influence the way we think about race. The study was also interested in how those thought patterns related to the detection of racism in social situations.

Thank you for your participation in this study. If you have further questions or concerns about the study, please contact Robert E. Gutierrez (contact information below).

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____ I have read and understand the information on this page